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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Reserve has asserted, with scant objection in the scholarly
literature, that it does not play a role in the problem of economic inequality in
the American economy.1 This claim asserts Fed inequality neutrality, despite
the role that Federal Reserve mortgage deregulation played in generating the
financial crisis. Moreover, both wealth and income inequality are the highest
they have been since 1928. The United States is more unequal than most of its
developed world peers.2 The Pew Research Center found that “the black-white
income gap in the US has persisted, with the difference in median household
incomes between whites and blacks, going from $19,000 in 1967 to roughly
$27,000 (measured in 2012 dollars).”3 After the financial crisis the racial
wealth gap has grown dramatically.4
The global financial crisis of 2008 and the American inequality crisis
converged to provide a rare opportunity to challenge macroeconomic orthodoxies that led to the financial collapse and enlarged preexisting economic
inequalities. The fact that housing finance was at the center of the 2008
financial crisis, highlighted yet another problem in the longstanding history of
private and governmental racial discrimination in access to housing finance
and the resulting economic inequality by race. 5
In this Article, I challenge the Federal Reserve’s claim of inequality
neutrality. This project was sparked when I listened to the entirety6 of the
1

See Nomination of Janet L. Yellen, of California, to be Chairman of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban
Affairs, 113th. Cong. 23-35 (2013) [hereinafter Yellen Nomination] (statement of Janet L.
Yellen, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (“Economists have
spent a lot of time trying to understand what is responsible for widening inequality. Many of
the underlying factors are things that are outside of the Federal Reserve's ability to address.”).
Once she became the Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Yellen
demonstrated the intellectual curiosity and leadership one might expect from an academic
economist. Her speeches to the American Economic Association after her confirmation set
a new research agenda for the entire macroeconomics profession. Interconnectedness and
Systemic Risk, infra note 190.
2
Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913:
Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q. J. ECON 519, 520–21 (2016).
3
Drew Desilver, 5 Facts About Economic Inequality, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 7, 2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/01/07/5-facts-about-economic-inequality/.
4
SARAH BURD-SHARPS & REBECCA RASCH, IMPACT OF THE US HOUSING CRISIS ON THE
RACIAL WEALTH GAP ACROSS GENERATIONS 9-14 (2015).
5
EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE: RACE, GENDER,
IDENTITY & ECONOMICS 102–03 (2d ed. 2011).
6
I live tweeted my reactions to the hearings Emma Coleman Jordan. @EconomicJustice,
TWITTER (Nov. 14, 2013), https://twitter.com/economicjustice.
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confirmation hearings of Chairwoman Janet Yellen.7 I was puzzled by her
response to a series of pointed questions from Senators concerned about
increasing wage stagnation and economic inequality. Yellen identified globalization, technology, and educational deficits as the source of the inequalities
we see. Yellen concluded, “What can the Fed do? We cannot change all of
those trends.”8
The Federal Reserve in its role as financial regulator was a major cause
of the mortgage securities financial crisis. The Fed contributed to inequality in
three significant ways. First, they contributed through inaction. The reduction
in oversight of origination practices for home mortgage lending is widely
acknowledged to be a cause of the financial crisis.9 The Federal Reserve was
the one entity with the power to impose responsible qualification standards for
home loans. It failed to exercise the power it had.10
The Fed did not reign in subprime lending when it became a rapidly
growing segment of the market for mortgages and when the Fed was the only
federal regulator with authority to do so.11 As the subprime loan origination
and distribution underwriting standards deteriorated, with abundant evidence
of pervasive racial discrimination, the Fed did not intervene. Subprime mortgages were disproportionately sold to people of color.12 Borrowers in minority
7

Yellen Nomination, supra note 1, at 4-84.
Id. at 35. To be fair, Chairwoman Yellen has a strong record of leadership on unemployment and the potential impact thereof: “Dr. Yellen's nomination is especially timely as our
nation struggles with high unemployment in the wake of the Great Recession. She has
devoted a large portion of her professional and academic career to studying the labor market,
unemployment, monetary policy, and the economy.” Id. at 1 (opening statement of Sen. Tim
Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs).
9
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) concluded “Widespread failures in
financial regulation and supervision proved devastating to the stability of the nation’s
financial markets.” FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT:
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES xviii (2011), http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/
cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf [hereinafter FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT].
10
Id. at xvii.
11
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found that “the prime example is the Federal
Reserve’s pivotal failure to stem the flow of toxic mortgages, which it could have done by
setting prudent mortgage–lending standards. The Federal Reserve was the one entity
empowered to do so and it did not.” Id.
12
See DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN, KEITH S. ERNST & WEI LI, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING, UNFAIR LENDING: THE EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON THE PRICE OF
SUBPRIME MORTGAGES 14-19 (2006) [hereinafter UNFAIR LENDING] (analyzing 50,000
mortgages and revealing statistically significant disparities between minority borrowers and
white borrowers).
8
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neighborhoods faced greater odds of receiving a subprime prepayment penalty
by a statistically significant margin.13 The Fed disregarded evidence that
African Americans were one-third and Latinos were 45% more likely to get a
high-priced loan than white borrowers with the same credit score.14 The Fed
failed to intervene when it received persistent reports of racial steering by
unregulated brokers. The record of racial steering by the nation’s largest banks
is incontrovertible. The Department of Justice settlement of racial steering
cases against the largest bank and the largest independent mortgage broker
provides ample documentation of the widespread nature of this problem.15
Second, the Fed undertook a series of deregulatory actions that led to the
crisis and exacerbated preexisting economic inequalities. The Fed’s program of
aggressive deregulation permitted banks to shift mortgage lending off-balance
sheet, and thus evade the safety net provided by regulated capital cushions. This,
in turn, opened the door to the development of the unregulated shadow banking16
system dependent on high leverage as the instability associated with leverage.
This sector lacked transparency to permit monitoring the size of its cumulative
balance sheet and interconnections among its counter parties. Shadow banks
provided short term financing for a daisy chain of origination and distribution
channels. Unregulated brokers became a major source of new subprime
mortgages. Many of these brokers relied on discriminatory racial steering
practices to generate a large volume of high cost subprime loans with features
that rendered them unsustainable for the low-income borrowers to whom they
were directed. The Fed played the lead role in weakening the financial system
by approving the off-balance-sheet path for complex structured financial
products that evaded the capital requirements applicable to formal banks. The
Fed directly approved double dipping, tax-advantaged capital dilution elements
of Bank Holding Company business plans that increased systemic risk.17 The
13

DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN & RICHARD ZHAI, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, BORROWERS IN HIGHER MINORITY NEIGHBORHOODS MORE LIKELY TO RECEIVE PREPAYMENT
PENALTIES 1 (2005).
14
UNFAIR LENDING, supra note 12, at 14, 16–19.
15

The DOJ announced that “Wells Fargo had also systematically placed African-American
and Hispanic Latino borrowers in subprime loans, while placing similarly-qualified white
borrowers in prime loans.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION’S ACCOMPLISHMENTS 2009–2012 23 (2013), https://www.justice.gov/crt/us-department-justice-civilrights-division-accomplishments-2009-2012.
16
The term, usually attributed to Paul McCulley, who first used it at a meeting of central
bankers attending the annual Jackson Hole retreat in 2007, refers to a system of credit
intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking system. See
generally Laura E. Kores, What is Shadow Banking? 50 FIN. & DEV. 42 (2013).
17
See Kim E. Lawry, Todd G. Eich & J. Michelle Grotts, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Trust Preferred
Securities and the Capital Strength of Banking Organizations, 7 SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS 3, 3–6
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Fed’s bank deregulatory policies, listed above, contributed to increasing wealth
inequality. The immediate cumulative impact of these policies can be seen in the
decline of household net worth, which fell $16 trillion, or 24% from the third
quarter 2007 to first quarter 2009.18
The Pew Research Center found that the portrait of declining wealth
was unequal among racial groups. During the crisis, African-Americans
experienced a 53% decline and Hispanic a 66% decline compared to a 16%
decline for white households.19 There was a significant racial difference in
wealth recovery after the Crisis. Pew found that from 2010 to 2013, the median
wealth of white households increased from $138,600 to $141,900, or by 2.4%.
By contrast, the median wealth of black households fell 33.7%, from $16,600
in 2010 to $11,000 in 2013. Among Hispanics, median wealth decreased by
14.3%, from $16,000 to $13,700. For all families—white, black and
Hispanic—median wealth is still less than its pre-recession level.20
Third, the Fed contributed to the problem of inequality by failing to
understand that the unregulated, structured finance pipeline to off-balancesheet securitizations allowed the financial sector to multiply fees and maximize profits. In fact, the unregulated financial sector surged dramatically
accounting for 29% of all profits in the economy,21 while the middle and
bottom of the wealth and income scale absorbed the losses resulting from this
economic disaster.
Perhaps most distressingly, once the crisis hit in September 2008, the
Fed adopted an incoherent application of the principle of moral hazard when it
provided $12.8 trillion of emergency assistance to shore up the unregulated
(2010) [hereinafter FDIC SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS] (providing the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation’s criticisms of the Federal Reserve’s decision to allow Bank Holding Companies,
regulated by the Federal Reserve, to treat Trusted Preferred Securities issued by those Companies
as Tier 1 Capital). See generally discussion of “TruPS Regulatory Arbitrage Frenzy,” infra note 18.
18
Tyler Atkinson, David Luttrell & Harvey Rosenblum, How Bad Was It? The Costs and
Consequences of the 2007–09 Financial Crisis, in 10 FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS,
STAFF PAPERS (Paper No. 20, 2013).
19
RAKESH KOCHHAR, RICHARD FRY & PAUL TAYLOR, PEW RESEARCH CTR., WEALTH GAPS
RISE TO RECORD HIGHS BETWEEN WHITES, BLACKS, AND HISPANICS 5 (2011).
20
Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened Along Racial, Ethnic
Lines Since End of Great Recession, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession/.
21
This Article examines the contributions of Fed regulatory policies to economic inequality.
A different discussion of the role of Fed monetary policy, especially the novel quantitative
easing program, in enhancing economic inequality is outside the scope of this paper. There
is intense discussion among macroeconomists about how interest rate policy and aggressive
bond buying stimulate the economy in the absence of legislative stimulus to replace the weak
consumer demand during the recession. The monetary policy critique of the Fed contribution
to inequality is robust and interesting, but is not a part of my argument.
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shadow bank money market funds, tri party repo and asset backed commercial
paper markets. The Fed’s commitment to consistent application of moral
hazard22 to dissuade market actors from expecting government rescues will be
a matter of controversy for years to come. Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers,
for instance, had many similarities in their distressed balance sheets; both were
filled with mortgage backed assets and dependent on overnight funding from
repo lenders. The Fed and Treasury explanations for saving Bear Stearns on
the one hand and letting Lehman fail shortly thereafter have varied from “they
had a hole in their balance sheet”23 and “the troubles at Lehman had been well
known for some time . . . Thus we judged that investors and counterparties had
had time to take precautionary measures”24 to we “did not have the legal ability
to save Lehman because the firm did not have sufficient collateral to secure a
loan from the Fed under Sec 13(3).”25 These actions thus triggered massive
uncertainty and panic in the opaque “shadow banking sector.”26
Finally, the Fed’s incoherent fidelity to the principle of moral hazard
led them to refuse to provide direct assistance to homeowners with unsustainable home mortgages. We can see that the Fed’s moral hazard myopia directly
contributed to post-crisis inequality by its refusal to use its emergency lending
authority to establish a facility for restructuring home mortgages during the
crisis. There was ample precedent for this approach in the 1934 New Deal
Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) whereby HOLC did restructure
mortgages to help individual citizens as well as banks.
This Article provides an introductory analysis of Fed actions before,
during, and after the 2008 financial crisis to challenge the accuracy of the claim
that “inequality was not within the jurisdiction of the Fed.” My goal for this
Article and my research agenda for the foreseeable future is to answer the
question, “What can the Fed Do About Inequality?”
22

See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 9, at 331 (providing insight into how
the Fed, and the New York Fed in particular, relied on moral hazard during the 2008 Lehman
bankruptcy). In a September 2008 memo circulated at the Federal Reserve during the
Lehman crisis, New York Fed Senior Vice President Patricia Moeser wrote: “No more
Maiden Lane LLCs and no equity position by [the] Fed. Moral hazard and reputation cost is
too high. If the Fed agrees to another equity investment, it signals that everything [the Fed]
did in March in terms of temporary liquidity backstops is useless. Horrible precedent; in the
long run MUCH worse than [bankruptcy] . . . [which would be a] mess on every level, but
fixes the moral hazard problem.”
23
Id. at 325.
24
Id. at 340.
25
Id.; Jennifer Dauble, Larry Kudlow Interviews Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson
on CNBC’s “Kudlow & Company” (Transcript Included), CNBC (July 23, 2007, 5:00 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/19921217.
26
See generally FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 9, at 27-37.
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I. INEQUALITY OVERVIEW
A. America’s Inequality Problem
1. A Racial History of Housing: The Overlooked Financial Crisis
A search of the Fed Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
transcripts from 2007-2008 fails to reveal a single mention of race–not one
within the entire 1,800 pages. The financial crisis was a sad and tangled
morass of human and economic failures that spanned the depth and breadth of
the market for home mortgages.27 In this section, I look at the active role of
pre-existing economic and social inequality28 in setting the conditions for the
first subprime mortgage products. These loan products contained many
undesirable features, including higher interest rates,29 points, and fees;
prepayment penalties; and variable rate payment schedules, often packaged as
‘pay option’ loans with negative amortization balloons. John Martin argues
that the high-risk cocktail of subprime loan features, combined with the rise
of the originate-to-distribute model of lending, precipitated the recent global
financial panic and economic collapse.30 In subsequent sections, I explore how
neo-classical economic theories31 about the dynamics of racial discrimination
in markets32 served to inhibit the regulatory response to widespread consumer
rights violations in the markets for subprime loans, even in the face of
accumulating evidence.
27

Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the
Federal Reserve System Conference on Housing and Mortgage Markets: Housing, Mortgage
Markets, and Foreclosures (Dec. 4, 2008), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/sp
eech/bernanke20081204a.htm.
28
U.S. DEP’T OF COM., CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY RACE AND HISPANIC
ORIGIN (2000) (indicating that, in 1999, the median income of Blacks was $29,423,
compared to $45,367 for whites).
29
ERIC STEIN, QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COST OF PREDATORY LENDING: A REPORT
FROM THE COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 2 (2001).
30
JOHN D. MARTIN ET AL., A PRIMER ON THE ROLE OF SECURITIZATION IN THE CREDIT
MARKET CRISIS OF 2007 1 (2011).
31
Gary Stanley Becker, The Economics of Racial Discrimination 41 (Jun. 1955)
(unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Chicago).
32
Id.; EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, SUBPRIME MORTGAGES: AMERICA’S LATEST BOOM AND
BUST 24 (2007) (“[R]acial minorities were basically shut out of the first American housing
boom at the close of World War II . . . [and currently] housing and mortgage markets have
become so complicated that discrimination seems to take place in many subtle ways.”)
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2. The Animal Spirits of Racial Exploitation:33 History of Government Sponsored Racially Discriminatory Mortgage Loans
Homeownership is the single most important means through which
Americans accumulate asset wealth. It is the centerpiece of middle class family
balance sheets. It follows, then, that the wealth gap between African Americans and other racial minorities and whites is largely attributable to the
nation’s history of racial discrimination in both the public and private sector
housing markets.
The housing industry was crushed by the financial exigencies of the
Great Depression, forcing the US government to abandon its traditionally
passive role in the residential housing market. Indeed, “[b]etween 1928 and
1933, home construction declined by 95 percent and spending on home
improvements fell by 90 percent.”34 The Roosevelt administration responded
to the housing crisis of the Great Depression by introducing several programs,
including the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC), The Fair Housing
Administration (FHA), and the Veterans Administration (VA). Housing was a
central building block of government support for FDR’s “forgotten man” at the
bottom of the economic pyramid. These government entities would implement
and institutionalize racially discriminatory practices that excluded African
Americans from homeownership. From 1930 to 1960, “fewer than one percent
of all mortgages in the nation were issued to African Americans.”35
The HOLC, a New Deal program created under the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board in 1933, was authorized to purchase qualifying mortgages from
financial institutions in exchange for tax-exempt 4%, eighteen-year bonds.
HOLC restructured these mortgages into fifteen- to twenty-year, fixed-rate,
fully amortized obligations at 5% interest rates, which benefitted borrowers by
reducing their payment burdens. “The HOLC was not quick to foreclose on
delinquent loans, being ‘as considerate of delinquent but deserving borrowers
as its responsibility to the Federal Government and the taxpaying public will
33

See generally GEORGE AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN
PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM
(2009).
34
See Charles Lewis Nier III, The Shadow of Credit: The Historical Origins of Racial
Predatory Lending and Its Impact Upon African American Wealth Accumulation, 11 U. PA.
J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 131, 174 (2007-2008) (citing KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS
FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 118 (1985) (citing STEPHAN
THERNSTROM, POVERTY AND PROGRESS: SOCIAL MOBILITY IN A NINETEENTH CENTURY CITY
117 (1964)) (explaining the effect of the Great Depression on the residential housing market).
35
Id. at 185 (citing DANIEL KIRP ET AL., OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING AND THE SOUL OF
SUBURBIA 7 (1995)).
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permit.’”36 The HOLC often counseled delinquent borrowers and readjusted
payment schedules, rather than moving quickly to foreclose when borrowers
fell behind on their payments. On average, HOLC loans were delinquent for
two years before foreclosure.37
HOLC assessed the eligibility of properties for assistance by
introducing a formal, written appraisal system that incorporated predominant
“notions of ethnic and racial worth,” thereby advancing the interests of whites
above that of minority communities and individuals, favoring segregation, and
implicitly sanctioning racially discriminatory lending policies. This rating
system was used to create color-coded residential security maps for use by real
estate appraisers.38 This system would later influence the “underwriting
practices of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the Veteran's
Administration (VA).” The HOLC’s racial classification system was based on
Homer Hoyt’s doctoral dissertation from the University of Chicago economics
department. Dr. Hoyt became the HOLC’s first economist in 1933, and
advanced to the FHA the following year to institute his discriminatory
mortgage appraisal system into FHA’s loan guarantee criteria.
The FHA and VA provided government insurance against losses for
qualifying mortgage instruments. These institutions encouraged individuals to
borrow by extending the repayment period of insured loans to twenty-five or
thirty years, which decreased monthly payment obligations. The loans were
fully amortized so that borrowers would own their homes at the end of the loan
term, a feature designed to coincide with a 30-year working life and retirement
at the age of 60.39 VA and FHA’s criteria for providing insurance to lenders
operated on the premise that racial segregation was necessary to ensure the
maintenance of property values, which furthered the exclusion of African
Americans from the housing market.
Adam Gordon explains that when the FHA decided to insure low-downpayment, long-term mortgages in order to promote homeownership, “it produced underwriting guidelines based on an economically and historically flawed
36

David C. Wheelock, Government Response to Home Mortgage Distress: Lessons from the
Great Depression 15 (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Research Division, Working Paper 2008038A, 2008), http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2008/2008-038.pdf (citing THIRD ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD 600 (1935), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
scribd/?item_id=23534&filepath=/files/docs/publications/holc/1935_annualrpt.pdf).
37
CLEMENT LOWELL HARRISS, HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOME OWNERS’ LOAN
CORPORATION 73 (1st ed. 1951).
38
THOMAS SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN
POSTWAR DETROIT 44 (2d ed. 2005) (reporting that, in Detroit, every African American
neighborhood was rated “D” or “hazardous” by federal appraisers)
39
JORDAN & HARRIS, supra note 5, at 80.
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understanding of a ‘natural’ progression of neighborhood racial change from allwhite (with high property values) to all-black (with low property values).”40
These guidelines rated a neighborhood’s suitability for FHA insurance based on
racial composition: “‘A’ neighborhoods had to be ‘homogenous’—meaning
‘American business and professional men’—and ‘American’—meaning white
and often, native-born. Predominantly black neighborhoods received a ‘D
grade’” under these guidelines.41 The geographic boundaries of the neighborhoods in which FHA was willing to guarantee home mortgages excluded all
black neighborhoods, and previously all-white neighborhoods that were in
transition from white to integrated.42 Thus, private financial institutions hoping
to qualify for FHA or VA insurance “were reluctant to provide mortgages to
areas inhabited by prosperous African Americans, and refused to originate any
mortgage loans to African Americans seeking to acquire property in the vicinity
of white neighborhoods.” Racially discriminatory procedures quickly became
standard throughout the mortgage industry, even for private individuals and
savings and loan institutions. While private insurers might have arisen to offer
African-Americans the opportunities denied to them by the FHA, Congress and
state legislatures amended safety-and-soundness regulations in a way that
disallowed competition with the FHA.43
3. Credit Starvation: A Necessary Precondition to Demand for
Subprime Loans
HOLC, FHA and VA were the exclusive venues for affordable home
mortgages. As a result, predatory practices, including pay day loans and land
sale contracts, surged to fill the void of government support for housing in
40

Adam Gordon, The Creation of Homeownership: How New Deal Changes in Banking
Regulation Simultaneously Made Homeownership Accessible to Whites and Out of Reach for
Blacks, 115 YALE L.J. 186, 189, 193, 208 (2005). Gordon describes a racially discriminatory
pattern of access to government home mortgage finance based on the underwriting criteria for the
FHA mortgage program that provided for the first timed 30 year fixed rate mortgages with down
payments as low as 20%. The FHA criteria were based upon the view that stable neighborhoods
were racially homogeneous and white. The geographic boundaries of the neighborhoods in which
FHA was willing to guarantee home mortgages excluded all black neighborhoods, and previously
white neighborhoods that were in transition from white to integrated.
41
Id. at 190–209.
42
Id. at 207-08, 216. The FHA’s underwriting manual warned appraisers of the dangers of
infiltration of racial minorities into white neighborhoods, and encouraged the use of
restrictive covenants as a mechanism for maintaining neighborhood stability via racial
segregation. This recommendation remained in place until 1950, two years after the Supreme
Court declared racial covenants unenforceable.
43
Id. at 189.
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redlined urban black neighborhoods. Predatory practices such as land sale
contracts flourished.44 Thus, federal housing policy was instrumental in
ensuring that “African-Americans were denied the opportunities to buy a
home in developing suburban neighborhoods and to build the wealth that
became the mainstay of the American white middle class.”45 Given that less
than 1% of mortgages were issued to blacks between 1930 and 1960, blacks
were frequently compelled to seek “less favorable, often predatory, forms of
mortgage financing.”46 “Blocked from low-interest government-backed
guaranteed loans, redlined by financial institutions, or barred from homeownership by restrictive covenants, black families have [long] been denied
the benefits of housing inflation and the subsequent vast increase in home
equity assets.”47 “[W]here blacks were prevented, often through violence,
from owning property, or loans were not granted to African American
business owners, or black homeowners could not access FHA mortgages, or
blacks were excluded from unions, or the police force, or fire departments meant that black families could not amass any meaningful wealth to bequeath
to future generations. This history helps explain the wealth and income gap
[that exists] between black and white, and the concentrated pockets of
poverty that persist in so many of today's urban and rural communities.”48
Blacks and other minorities were set up as easy targets for predatory lending
by decades of exclusion from prime lending opportunities. Indeed, “African
44

See generally BERYL SATTER, FAMILY PROPERTIES: HOW THE STRUGGLE OVER RACE AND
REAL ESTATE TRANSFORMED CHICAGO AND URBAN AMERICA (2010).
45
Gordon, supra note 40, at 190–209. See also Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial
Segregation and the American Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 629, 630 (2010).
46
Nier, supra note 34, at 185.
47
MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH, WHITE WEALTH: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 23 (1997) (“Blocked from low-interest governmentbacked loans, redlined out by financial institutions, or barred from homeownership by banks,
black families have been denied the benefits of housing inflation and the subsequent vast
increase in home equity assets.”).
48
Nier, supra note 34, at 132 (citations omitted). See also Spencer Overton, But Some Are
More Equal: Race, Exclusion, and Campaign Finance, 80 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1006 (2002)
(“The racial disparity in wealth realized through home ownership and home value originally
caused by federal housing policies has since been compounded by seemingly neutral public
and private decisions. Because people of color are less likely to own homes, they are less
likely to take advantage of tax provisions allowing for the deduction of a large percentage of
their housing costs (all property taxes and mortgage interest). Further, the home values
appreciated dramatically during the period between 1934 and the 1970s, and this increase
benefited whites more than people of color. Even people of color who were able to purchase
homes were less likely than whites to benefit from increasing home values because of the
slower rate of appreciation of property in nonwhite areas.”).
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Americans, along with other minorities and low-income populations, have
been the targets of the sub-prime mortgage system,”49 as targeting has
replaced redlining as a means of financial exploitation.
In fact, the growth of subprime lending has been disproportionately
concentrated among African Americans and in African American neighborhoods. In 1993, subprime refinancing loans accounted for just 8% of home
loans in African American neighborhoods and 1% in white neighborhoods. By
1998, the number of subprime refinancing loans had dramatically increased to
51% of the total loans in African American neighborhoods compared to only
9% in white neighborhoods. By 2005, 52% of the total mortgage loans to
African Americans were subprime loans, in contrast to 19% for whites.
4. Bait and Switch: Financially Vulnerable Populations Take the Bait
Financially vulnerable populations50—long excluded from prime
lending opportunities and accustomed to predatory debt—historically had little
chance to become homeowners. Earlier prime borrowers took mortgages for
30 years, with 20% cash down payments, borrowing 80% at interest rates
averaging about 6%. Then, in the eleven-year period between 1994 and 2005,
the subprime mortgage became a new product for financing the homes of
middle- and working-class borrowers.51 Unlike the prime borrowers who
fueled the growth of middle class wealth in the post-war years, subprime
borrowers in the late 90’s had lower incomes, more compromised credit scores,
and less money to make down payments on a house. In addition, these families
did not have the benefit of the wealth accumulated from previous home
ownership. Most subprime borrowers required 100% financing due to limited
incomes with no surplus for a down payment. Second, subprime loans were
49

Thomas M. Shapiro & Melvin L. Oliver, Sub-Prime as a Black Catastrophe, AM. PROSPECT
(Sept. 22, 2008), http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=sub_prime_as_a_black_catastrophe.
50
The pattern of racial discrimination across many sectors of consumer transactions has been
demonstrated with empirical methods in highly influential studies; Ian Ayres, in particular, has
conducted and published studies that document patterns of racial discrimination across a wide
variety of high-value consumer transactions. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and
Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 827–41 (1991)
(demonstrating, through empirical evidence, that retail car dealerships systematically offer
substantially better prices on identical cars to white men than to blacks or women); IAN AYRES,
PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION
(2001) (presenting evidence that blacks and women are consistently at a disadvantage in
multiple markets, including bail bonding, kidney transplantation, and FCC licensing).
51
GRAMLICH, supra note 32, at 3 (“While all income groups have participated in this new
opening up the mortgage market and rise in homeownership, low- and moderate- income
households and racial and ethnic minorities have been at the center of the boom.”).
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designed to calibrate the loan features to borrower characteristics at much
higher interest rates to compensate lenders for the risk of default inherent in
lending to buyers with no equity in the mortgage origination.52
The key distinction between the prime and subprime borrower during
the period of rapid growth of home ownership 1994–200553 is that subprime
borrowers had lower family incomes.54 These new entrants to homeownership
could only aspire to move from renting to home-owning when the new
subprime mortgage products allowed them to substitute borrowing over thirty
years for accumulated home equity from previous homes, or saving out of
current income for the standard 10–20 percent down payment.55
The data that follows shows that preexisting income inequalities by
race, when combined with inequalities in accumulated housing wealth, created
opportunities for introducing new loan products to borrowers who had previously been excluded from home ownership. The exclusion was due to not only
the amount, sources and stability of family income but also the structural features of government-facilitated discrimination in the home mortgage industry.56
52

Id. See generally Rosen Richard J., The Impact of the Originate-to-Distribute Model on
Banks Before and During the Financial Crisis (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago, Working
Paper No. WP-10-20, 2011).
53
Id. at 3. Gramlich discusses the dramatic expansion of homeownership in the period
immediately following World War II. “The overall homeownership rate/percentage of home
owners rose from 45% to 65% in the ten years following after the war.” See also Gordon,
supra note 40, at 193; GRAMLICH, supra note 32, at 1. Gordon describes a racially
discriminatory pattern of access to home mortgage finance based on the underwriting criteria
for the FHA mortgage program that first provided 30 year fixed rate mortgages with down
payments as low as 20%. The FHA criteria were based on the view that stable neighborhoods
were racially homogeneous and white. The geographic boundaries of the neighborhoods in
which FHA was willing to guarantee home mortgages excluded all black neighborhoods, and
previously white neighborhoods that were in transition from white to integrated. JAMES
GREER, RACE AND MORTGAGE REDLINING IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2012). In short,
“African Americans, along with other minorities and low-income populations, have been the
targets of the sub-prime mortgage system.” Shapiro & Oliver, supra note 49.
54
THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN 119 (2004).
55
GRAMLICH, supra note 32, at 1–2.
56
Gordon, supra note 40, at 189, 207, 209, 222. Gordon explains that when the FHA decided that
it would insure low-down-payment, long-term mortgages in order to promote homeownership, it
“produced underwriting guidelines based on an economically and historically flawed
understanding of a ‘natural’ progression of neighborhood racial change from all-white (with high
property values) to all-black (with low property values).” Id. at 189. “These guidelines rated a
neighborhood’s suitability for insurance based on racial composition . . . .” Id.
The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation rated every urban and suburban
neighborhood in America as “A,” “B,” “C,” or “D” quality, color coding
maps of every metropolitan area (“D,” or lowest quality, was colored red—
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If we look at income measures we can see that by 2001, the beginning
of the housing bubble in America, the nominal gap in median net household
wealth between blacks and whites had grown from $44,000 in 1984 to $86,000
in 2001. This income gap helped set the stage for differences in home ownership rates.57
In addition to the effects of disparate income, as Thomas Shapiro and
Melvin Oliver have established, the down payment deficit of lower-income
borrowers is a direct byproduct of intergenerational wealth differences between
blacks and whites that are attributable to the legacy of slavery and Jim Crow
employment and residential segregation.
Racial disparities in housing finance posed systemic financial risks
because pre-existing income, credit, wealth, and housing ownership disparities
between blacks and whites created virtually irresistible pools for subprime
mortgage transactions, with scant government oversight. The Fed’s failure to
control exploitative mortgage products combined with prevailing social
attitudes and stubborn practices of housing segregation created a perfect storm
that devastated the global financial community.58 The interconnectedness of
financial institutions, both regulated and largely unregulated, provided the oncehidden vector for spreading losses caused by the predictable defaults in segregated communities to the balance sheets of investors throughout the globe.
the origin of the term “redlining”). Quality ratings were based on age and
type of housing stock, but also very much on race. “A” neighborhoods had
to be “homogenous”—meaning “American business and professional
men”— and “American”—meaning white and often, native-born.99
Predominantly black neighborhoods received a “D” grade.
Id. at 207 (citations omitted). Consequently, the FHA’s underwriting criteria resulted in
“much lower rates of lending to nonwhites than to whites.” Id. at 209. “African Americans
were denied the opportunities to buy a home in developing suburban neighborhoods and to
build the wealth that became the mainstay of the American white middle class.” Id. at 222.
When African Americans did buy homes, usually using conventional
mortgages, they not only tended to pay more in down payments and
roughly the same monthly payments when compared with whites using
FHA-insured mortgages, but they also got much lower-quality homes.
While private insurers might have arisen to offer African-Americans the
opportunities denied to them by the FHA, Congress and state legislatures
amended safety-and-soundness regulations in a way that disallowed
competition with the FHA.
Id.
57
GRAMLICH, supra note 32, at 3. “[F]rom 1994 to 2005, the overall rate rose from 64 to 69
percent.” Id. However, “the rate for blacks rose from 42 to 49 percent.” Id.
58
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. AT HARV. UNIV., THE STATE OF NATION’S HOUSING 17 (2008).
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5. Mortgage Brokers Compensation: Financial Incentives for
Racial Steering
At an inner-city intersection, where globalized capital and free-market
finance meet America's shameful history of racial segregation and subordination, a new and insidious form of racial discrimination lurks. Where lending
discrimination once took a binary form—bigoted loan officers rejecting loan
applicants because of their skin color—the new model of discrimination is pure
and simple exploitation. Unscrupulous lenders now take advantage of a history
of racial redlining by aggressively marketing overpriced loan products with
onerous terms in the same neighborhoods where mainstream lenders once
refused to lend.
“Conflicts of interest created by the OTD model provide the most likely
explanation for the links between securitization, higher-risk loans and rising
default rates.”59 Lenders earned higher fees for selling subprime loans
packaged into private label mortgage backed securities than for selling prime
loans packaged into GSE issued mortgage-backed securities.54 As a result,
lenders encouraged their mortgage brokers to sell more subprime loans by
offering larger commissions and yield-spread premiums as incentive, among
other things.60
During the subprime boom, many large mortgage originators restructured their commission systems so that mortgage loan officers and underwriters
would be paid considerably higher commissions when customers purchased
subprime loans instead of prime loans. Wells Fargo is one such mortgage
originator. The company adopted a commission structure that favored subprime loan origination in company offices nationwide. As a result, many Wells
Fargo loan officers earned over a half million dollars per year.61 Beth Jacobson,
59

Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates
and the Origins of Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. LAW. REV. 963, 1024 (2009).
54
Id.
60
Peter S. Goodman & Gretchen Morgenson, Saying Yes to Anyone: WaMu Built Empire on
Shaky Loans, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2008), https://nyti.ms/2kAYlAf (“WaMu gave mortgage
brokers handsome commissions for selling the riskiest loans, which carried higher fees,
bolstering profits and ultimately the compensation of the bank's executives”); Gretchen
Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2007),
https://nyti.ms/2k9mJIB (“The company's incentive system . . . encouraged brokers and sales
representatives to move borrowers into the subprime category, even if their financial position
meant that they belonged higher up the loan spectrum.”); Wilmarth, supra note 59, at 1025–
26 (2009) (discussing that lenders had incentives to promote high-risk loans, such as earning
higher fees).
61
Ylan Q. Mui, Ex-loan Officer Claims Wells Fargo Targeted Black Communities for
Shoddy Loans, WASH. POST (Jun 12, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/econ
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a Baltimore loan officer for Wells Fargo “churned out roughly $50 million in
loans annually for Wells Fargo, making her the top-producing subprime officer
in the country. She earned as much as $700,000 one year, more than seven
times the company’s stated average for subprime-loan officers in her area.”62
The incentive to maximize profits led to widespread misconduct in
mortgage origination practices by brokers throughout the industry. Prior to
the reform measures, “consumers [paid] penalties that [made] it more
expensive—and sometimes impossible . . . to switch out of their loans if they
[felt] they have been given a bad deal,” giving lenders an incentive to sell
iniquitous adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs). This is perhaps why “more
than fifty-seven percent of the subprime loans granted in 2006 are in
foreclosure or pre-foreclosure.”63 Brokers disproportionally targeted AfricanAmericans with adjustable rate mortgages.64
In her sworn affidavit, Beth Jacobson, a Baltimore-based former
employee of Wells Fargo, described a work environment in which officers
often used dishonesty and fraud to shift customers into subprime products. Ms.
Jacobson reported that colleagues “falsified loan applications in order to [steer
prime borrowers to] subprime loans,” sometimes cutting and pasting credit
reports for one customer onto another's application, or falsely claiming that the
applicant did not wish to provide documentation to override computer
restrictions on subprime loan allocations.65
Another Wells Fargo employee, Mr. Tony Paschal, reported in his
affidavit that when computer software flagged subprime loans going to what
should have been prime customers, underwriters would enter one of a number
of “stock responses,” including “customer has no assets,” to override the
omy/former-wells-fargo-loan-officer-testifies-in-baltimore-mortgage-lawsuit/2012/06/12/g
JQA6EGtXV_story.html.
62
Id.
63
Chris Levister, Landmark Financial Overhaul Will Protect African Americans, BLACK
VOICE NEWS (Jul. 24, 2010), http://newamericamedia.org/2010/07/landmark-financial-over
haul-will-protect-african-americans.php.
64
CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, UNFAIR AND UNSAFE: HOW COUNTRYWIDE’S
IRRESPONSIBLE PRACTICES HAVE HARMED BORROWERS AND SHAREHOLDERS 2 (2008)
(stating that borrowers and regulators have accused Countrywide of engaging in: “steering
borrowers with good credit into higher-cost “subprime” loans; gouging minority borrowers
with discriminatory rates and fees; working in cahoots with mortgage brokers who use baitand-switch tactics to land borrowers into loans they can’t afford; targeting elderly and nonEnglish-speaking borrowers for abusive loans; and packing loans with inflated and unauthorized fees”).
65
Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider, Baltimore v. Wells Fargo (D. Md. June 29, 2009) (No.
1:08-cv-00062-BEL), at *22 (copies of docket court filings are on file with Journal of Law
& Public Affairs).
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system and approve the loan. Loans to minority borrowers were the centerpiece
of the subprime loan fee maximizing strategy. Mr. Paschal remarked that the
bank put “bounties” on minority customers, offering cash incentives to
employees who aggressively marketed subprime loans in minority communities. Wells Fargo encouraged its loan officer to push subprime loans in black
churches and to conduct seminars in minority neighborhoods.66 For instance,
the Wells Fargo office in Silver Spring, Maryland, created an Affinity Group
consisting entirely of African American employees whose job was to target
African Americans and African American churches. Employees began to refer
to minority customers as “mud people,” and the subprime loans made to them
as “ghetto loans.”67
Studies disclose that a black homebuyer, “even in upper-income
African-American neighborhoods . . . is one-and-a-half times as likely to have a
subprime loan as persons in low-income white neighborhoods.”68 “[T]he Federal
Reserve found that African Americans—especially black women—were two to
three times more likely to be steered into costly subprime mortgages, even when
they had good credit[.]”69 Additionally, “when these consumers tried to get out
of high-rate loans, they often couldn't because the loans had balloon payments
or were packed with expensive prepayment penalties.”70
In the years leading up to the financial meltdown, more than half of the
loans granted to African Americans were subprime. In fact, African Americans
“were three times more likely to receive higher-priced loans than whites.”71
66

Id. at 17.
PAUL MUOLO & MATHEW PADILLA, CHAIN OF BLAME: HOW WALL STREET CAUSED THE
MORTGAGE AND CREDIT CRISIS 64–69, 82–87, 120–25, 263–65 (2008).
68
MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, EVERYDAY LAW FOR CONSUMERS (2015).
69
Lynette Khalfani-Cox, Study Shows Dramatic Decrease in Mortgage Loans to Minorities,
THE GRIOT (Feb. 16, 2011), http://thegrio.com/2011/02/16/study-shows-dramatic-decreasein-mortgage-loans-to-minorities/. See also ALLEN J. FISHBEIN & PATRICK WOODALL,
CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., WOMEN ARE PRIME TARGETS FOR SUBPRIME LENDING: WOMEN
ARE DISPROPORTIONATELY REPRESENTED IN HIGH-COST MORTGAGE MARKET 4 (2006)
(“Women are more likely to receive subprime mortgages than men of the same race and
women of color are much more likely to receive subprime mortgages than white men.”).
70
Lynette Khalfani-Cox, The President’s Financial Reform & African Americans; TONY
BARD WRITE: DESTINATIONS (Jul. 22, 2010) http://tonybardwrite.blogspot.com/2010/07/
financial-reform-and-african-americans.html. See generally Roberto G. Quercia et al., The
Impact of Predatory Loan Terms on Subprime Foreclosures: The Special Case of
Prepayment Penalties & Balloon Payments, 21 CORNELL J. OF LAW AND PUB. POL’Y 247,
255 (2007) (“[R]efinance loans with prepayment penalties are 20% more likely to experience
a foreclosure, and loans with balloon payments are about 50% more likely to do so.”).
71
Alexander J. Chenault, New Financial Regulation Reform: A Good Measure for African
Americans, 33 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 123, 134-35 (2011). See generally DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REACHES SETTLEMENT WITH WELLS FARGO RESULTING IN
67
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6. Securitization: Boomerang Contracts and the Paradox of Financial
Engineering (the Originate-To-Distribute Model72)
Traditional mortgages were issued by bankers in green eyeshades.
Mortgages stayed on bank balance sheets. As such, community bankers carefully scrutinized the credit worthiness of each individual borrower in order to
ensure that their investment was ultimately profitable. Portfolio lenders approved home mortgages based on ability to repay and full documentation, and then,
only if the borrower had accumulated a twenty percent cash down payment.
Securitization allowed banks to convert illiquid mortgages into assetbacked securities (ABS) that could be sold to investors through capital markets.
This allowed banks to reduce their reliance on deposits for funding to make
loans. Notably, banks were able to move loans off their balance sheets and
thereby reduce their regulatory capital requirements through securitization of
their mortgage holdings. Notes Arthur Wilmarth, Jr., “Securitization offered at
least three additional benefits to lenders. First, banks with less than a ‘AAA’
credit rating could use securitizations to create ABS that qualified for ‘AAA’ratings. Second, banks earned substantial fees for originating and securitizing
loans and could earn additional fees by servicing the loans held in securitized
pools. Third, securitization permitted banks to transfer to investors much of the
credit risk associated with the securitized loans.”73 Thus, a bank that originated
a loan that it securitized and sold to investors on the secondary market would
be insulated from financial harm in the event of default by the borrower. In a
2011 report, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission noted that the opportunity for increased profits created by securitization incentivized banks to
originate and distribute as many loans as possible. The corresponding insulation from risk simultaneously removed the incentive to ensure the long-term
profitability of mortgage products, creating what some have referred to as the
conditions of a perfect storm.74
MORE THAN $175 MILLION IN RELIEF FOR HOMEOWNERS TO RESOLVE FAIR LENDING
CLAIMS (2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-settlement-wellsfargo-resulting-more-175-million-relief (“The Department of Justice . . . filed the second
largest fair lending settlement in the department’s history to resolve allegations that Wells
Fargo . . . engaged in a pattern of discrimination against qualified African-American and
Hispanic borrowers in its mortgage lending . . . .”).
72
See DAVID MARSTON ET AL., INT’L MONETARY FUND, UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL
INTERCONNECTEDNESS 5 (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/10
0410.pdf [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS] (illustrating
global interconnections and risk concentrations in the run up to the 2008 financial crisis).
73
Wilmarth, supra note 59, at 985.
74
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 9, at 3.
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Financial Institutions adopted the originate to distribute (OTD)
business model “in order to (i) maximize fee income, (ii) reduce their capital
charges, and (iii) transfer to investors (at least ostensibly) the risks associated
with securitized loans and structured-finance products.” At the largest of these
financial institutions, fees were collected at every stage of the OTD process,
and represented 76% of total earnings by 2007.75
The originate-to-distribute model cut the traditional link of reciprocal
accountability between borrower and lender. The effect was the opposite.
Instead of distance and separation, the new products created greater enmeshment; an unintended dependence among investors and between lenders and
borrowers. “[A]s large financial conglomerates pursued similar OTD and feemaximizing strategies, their collective exposures to financial risks-including
credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk and systemic risk increased dramatically.”76
The emerging system of shadow banking through unregulated off
balance sheet financial institutions created bonds of international balance sheet
linkage that were invisible before the financial crisis revealed these crucial
linkages based on complex financial engineering.77
7. Boomerang Contracts and the Paradox of Financial Engineering
Several studies have confirmed that there is a strong linkage between
increased levels of securitization and increasingly risky lending behavior
among financial institutions. For example, one study found that if lenders in a
particular community used securitization to sell a higher percentage of their
loans after origination, that community would receive higher risk subprime
mortgages and record higher default and foreclosure rates. The “securitized
share of nonprime loans increased significantly between 2001 and 2006, during
the same period when lending standards were declining.”78
Antje Berndt and Anurag Gupta examine and compare the long run
performance of borrowers where there is an active secondary market for the
loans and those where there is no such market.79 They explain that moral
hazard and adverse selection play a significant role in determining the riskiness
of bank lending. The banks’ superior information about the credit quality of
75

Wilmarth, supra note 59, at 995. Perhaps most importantly, the OTD approach also offered
financial conglomerates the apparent benefit of shifting to investors the risks associated with
securitized loans and other structured finance products.
76
Id. at 996.
77
See generally UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS, supra note 72.
78
Id. at 1024.
79
Antje Berndt & Anurag Gupta, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in the Originate-toDistribute Model of Bank Credit, 56 J. MONETARY ECON. 725, 728 (2009).
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their loans gave rise to “adverse selection,” whereby banks sell off loans about
which they have negative private information. Berndt and Gupta assert that
banks originate “lemons” in order to “expand their origination-fee-based
income, since they are able to sell these loans, relatively easily in the secondary
market to outside investors . . . .”80
Additionally, banks that sell loans would have a reduced incentive to
engage in costly screening and monitoring of the borrowers about whom they
have negative private information, since the lending relationship is ultimately
severed.81 Also, when the “borrowers lose the discipline of lender monitoring, they may be more prone to making suboptimal investment and operating
decisions, which leads to their negative long-run performance and value
destruction.”
As the securitized share of nonprime lending increased, lending
standards deteriorated. Financial institutions offered more subprime mortgages, which required low initial payments and much higher payments after
their introductory teaser interest and payment rates expired. When interest
rates of these adjustable rate mortgages were reset, borrowers experienced
payment shock.
In general, borrowers who entered these subprime loan contracts would
be in danger of default if they could not refinance their mortgages before teaser
rates expired—an option available only as long as housing prices continued to
increase.82 When housing prices stagnated in 2006 and began to decrease in
2007, these borrowers could no longer refinance. The Ponzi scheme of housing
finance became unsustainable when borrowers could no longer take out new
loans to pay off old ones, resulting in an explosion of defaults and foreclosures,
and ultimately, the financial crisis.83
80

Id.
Id. at 727. Especially true because of rapid exhaustion of prime borrower pools that have
resources to afford down payments once securitization becomes possible “with enormous
fees accruing to those throughout the mortgage supply chain, from the mortgage broker
selling the loans, to small banks that funded the brokers, to the giant investment banks behind
them. By approximately 2003, the supply of mortgages originated at traditional lending
standards had been exhausted. However, continued strong demand for MBS and CDO began
to drive down lending standards, as long as mortgages could still be sold along the supply
chain. Eventually, this speculative bubble proved unsustainable.” DONALD RAPP, BUBBLES,
BOOMS, AND BUSTS: THE RISE AND FALL OF FINANCIAL ASSETS 290 (2d ed. 2014); see also
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 9, at 11.
82
While the housing boom lasted, many nonprime borrowers refinanced their loans (several
times, in some cases) by taking out new ARMs with similar teaser rate and interest escalation
features. Wilmarth, supra note 59, at 1021–24.
83
Id. at 970.
81
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8. Data Brokers and the New Efficiency of Discriminatory Lending
Privacy advocates have encouraged improved government regulation of
the data broker84 industry in recent years, particularly with regard to the role of
data brokers in facilitating the data driven marketing strategies in various
business sectors. Due to mounting concern, both the US Government
Accountability Office (GAO) and the Senate Commerce Committee have
recently released reports detailing the results of their investigations into data
broker industry practices.85
The Senate Commerce Committee report, released on December 18,
2013, focused on determining what consumer data the data broker industry
collects; how specific this data is; how the data broker industry obtains
consumer data; who buys this data; and how is it used. The Committee
concluded that government regulations have lagged behind the technological
advancements that have served to exponentially increase the availability of
various types of consumer information. Notably, the Committee found that data
brokers routinely compile and sell consumer profiles in which consumers are
categorized and scored according to their degree of “financial vulnerability.”
The Committee found that:
A number of these products focus on consumers’ financial
vulnerability, carrying titles such as “Rural and Barely
Making It,” “Ethnic Second-City Strugglers,” “Retiring on
Empty: Singles,” “Tough Start: Young Single Parents,” and
“Credit Crunched: City Families.”86 One company reviewed,
sells a marketing tool that helps to “identify and more effectively market to under-banked consumers” that the company
describes as individuals including “widows” and “consumers
with transitory lifestyles, such as military personnel” who
84

The Commerce Committee report adopted a broad definition of "data broker" developed
by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC): "[c]ompanies that collect information, including
personal information about consumers, from a wide variety of sources for the purpose of
reselling such information to their customers for various purposes, including verifying an
individual's identity, differentiating records, marketing products, and preventing financial
fraud[.]” FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY i (2014).
85
See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-663, INFORMATION
RESELLERS: CONSUMER PRIVACY FRAMEWORK NEEDS TO REFLECT CHANGES IN
TECHNOLOGY AND THE MARKETPLACE (2013).
86
What Information Do Data Brokers Have on Consumers, and How Do They Use It? Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 113th Cong. 2 (2013).
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annually spend millions on payday loans and other “nontraditional” financial products. The names, descriptions and
characterizations in such products likely appeal to companies
that sell high-cost loans and other financially risky products to
populations more likely to need quick cash, and the sale and
use of these consumer profiles merits close review . . . .87
It is now beyond dispute that predatory businesses, including some
originators of subprime mortgages, used consumer profiles to target vulnerable
populations, who are, as previously discussed, disproportionately consumers
of color. For instance, according to the Senate Committee Report, “In October
of 2012, the FTC alleged that the credit reporting division of Equifax
improperly sold more than 17,000 ‘prescreened’ lists of consumers who were
late on their mortgage payments to Direct Lending Source, Inc. and its affiliate
companies.88 Direct Lending subsequently resold some of these lists to third
parties, who “used the lists to pitch loan modification and debt relief services
to people in financial distress, including to companies that had been the subject
of prior law enforcement investigations.”89
Many scholars have attributed the systemic failure of the US housing
market to the inability of financially vulnerable consumers to refinance or
make good on ballooning debt obligations. We know now that these financially vulnerable individuals, disproportionately racial minorities that have
suffered historical exclusion from the prime credit market, were intentionally
targeted by predatory businesses, often through information garnered from
data brokers.
This evidence begs the question: absent a history of racial discrimination in housing that created an easily identifiable population of financially
vulnerable minorities, would the subprime industry have flourished as it did?
Also, if subprime loans had been pushed onto more vulnerable whites, or onto
financially capable whites, would their political capital have effected a more
robust effort to stomp out predatory lending activities before the flame began
to burn out of control?
87

OFF. OF OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS MAJORITY STAFF, A REVIEW OF THE DATA
BROKER INDUSTRY: COLLECTION, USE, AND SALE OF CONSUMER DATA FOR MARKETING
PURPOSES i-ii (2013) (Staff Report for Chairman Rockefeller).
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Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Settlements Require Equifax to Forfeit Money
Made by Allegedly Improperly Selling Information About Millions of Consumers Who
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9. Statistical Evidence of Racial Bias in Home Finance Markets
Douglas Massey is one of the preeminent demographers of national
patterns of residential segregation. In a study of the relationship between racial
segregation and the foreclosure crisis,90 Massey and his doctoral student, Jacob
Rugh, concluded that the rise in subprime lending and the ensuing wave of
foreclosures was partly a result of market forces that have been well-identified
in the literature, but it was also a highly racialized process. They argue that
residential segregation created a unique niche of minority clients who were
differentially marketed risky subprime loans that were in great demand for use
in mortgage-backed securities that could be sold on secondary markets. Rugh
and Massey tested this argument by regressing foreclosure actions in the top
100 US metropolitan areas on measures of black, Hispanic, and Asian segregation while controlling for a variety of housing market conditions, including
average creditworthiness, the extent of coverage under the Community
Reinvestment Act, the degree of zoning regulation, and the overall rate of
subprime lending. They found that black residential dissimilarity and spatial
isolation are powerful predictors of foreclosures across US metropolitan areas.91
B. Wealth Trends: The Federal Reserve, Financial Crisis, and
Wealth Inequality
1. Wealth Inequality
Emmanuel Saez and Thomas Piketty have created the definitive database for analysing income inequality and wealth for 20 countries over a period
of 100 years.
Piketty introduced his influential research and inequality arguments,
Capital in the Twenty-First Century, with a blunt recognition: “Although the
American Revolution established the republican principle, it allowed slavery
to continue for nearly a century and legal racial discrimination for nearly two
centuries. The race question still has a disproportionate influence on the social
question in the United States today.”92 For Piketty, “The history of the distri90

Rugh & Massey, supra note 45, at 630.
See id. at 629 (“To isolate subprime lending as the causal mechanism through which
segregation influences foreclosures, we estimate a two-stage least squares model that
confirms the causal effect of black segregation on the number and rate of foreclosures across
metropolitan areas. We thus conclude that segregation was an important contributing cause
of the foreclosure crisis, along with overbuilding, risky lending practices, lax regulation, and
the bursting of the housing price bubble.”).
92
THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 30 (2014).
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bution of wealth has always been deeply political, and it cannot be reduced to
purely economic mechanisms . . . the resurgence of inequality after 1980 is due
largely to the political shifts of the past several decades, especially in regard to
taxation and finance.”93

Source: EMMANUEL SAEZ & GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE DISTRIBUTION OF
US WEALTH, CAPITAL INCOME AND RETURNS SINCE 1913 29 (2014).

Source: EMMANUEL SAEZ & GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE DISTRIBUTION OF
US WEALTH, CAPITAL INCOME AND RETURNS SINCE 1913 33 (2014).
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Source: EMMANUEL SAEZ & GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE DISTRIBUTION OF
US WEALTH, CAPITAL INCOME AND RETURNS SINCE 1913 30 (2014).

Source: EMMANUEL SAEZ & GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE DISTRIBUTION OF
US WEALTH, CAPITAL INCOME AND RETURNS SINCE 1913 43 (2014).

When we think of inequality, we often think of income inequality,
which has increased markedly in the past decades, with the Gini94 coefficient
94

The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal
distribution. WORLD BANK, GINI INDEX, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI.
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rising from 38.6 in 1967 to 46.8 in 2009.95 However, that increase actually
understates the extent of the inequality in the US economy. In fact, wealth is
far less equally distributed than income. That has always been true, but the
disparities have been seriously exacerbated by the recent recession. This gap is
particularly visible when examined along racial identity categories.
Whites and Asians started with high net worth, while Blacks and
Hispanics started with low net worth. Accordingly, among the latter two groups,
the decline, though small in absolute terms, was nonetheless more financially
damaging than the corresponding decline in the former two, leaving Blacks and
Hispanics with 2009 median net worth of $5,677 and $6,325 respectively. By
comparison, white households had a median net wealth of $113,149.96
Most of the decline is attributable to losses sustained on real estate. This
is especially true for Hispanic and Asian populations, which tended to be
concentrated in areas particularly hard-hit by the decline in the real estate
market. 83% of the decline in White median net worth was attributable to real
estate, compared with 96% for Hispanics, 90% for Blacks, and 92.5% for
Asians. Indeed, looking strictly at median home equity, Hispanics lost 51%,
Asians 32%, Blacks 23%, and Whites 18%.97
Furthermore, Black and Hispanic populations hold a far higher
percentage of net wealth in the form of real estate. Over 80% of Whites and
Asians hold financial assets, compared with only 60% of Blacks and Hispanics.
A substantial disparity exists across all types of financial holdings as well.
Looking at stocks and mutual funds, we see that between 2005 and 2009
Hispanics lost 32% of portfolio value, Blacks an alarmingly high 71%, and
Whites 9%. Asians actually gained 19%. In considering these figures, it should
be remembered that in 2005, only 8% of Hispanics and 9% of Blacks had stock
or mutual fund holdings, compared with 31% of Whites and 29% of Asians. In
2009, the numbers had fallen to 5%, 7%, 27%, and 24% respectively.98
To get a sense of both the starting scale of the disparities and the levels
to which they have risen, consider the ratios of median net wealth. In 1995,
White households were worth approximately 7 times as much as Black households. By 2004, that ratio had risen to 11. By 2009, it was 19, the highest ever
recorded. Hispanic households held constant at a ratio of 7 from 1996 through
95

See LANE KENWORTHY & TIMOTHY SMEEDING, GINI GROWING INEQUALITIES’ IMPACTS:
GROWING INEQUALITIES AND THEIR IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (2013) (using an analysis
“series [to] show steadily increasing inequality, with some cyclical fluctuation [and] changes in
household size have had a small effect on income inequality in the United States as the lines do
grow closer together (though changes in family structure might have had a larger impact . . . .”).
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KOCHHAR, FRY & TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 1.
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Id. at 18.
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Id. at 22.
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2004. By 2009, however, the ratio had increased to 15. Asian house-holds were
worth 125% of White households in 2005, but fell to 69% in 2009.99
Not only was the recession not felt equally among demographic
groups—it was not felt equally within those groups. Declines in net worth
occurred among both the richest and the poorest, but within all groups, the
percentage of households with zero or negative net worth increased markedly,
rising 36% among Whites, 35% among Hispanics, 21% among Blacks, and
58% among Asians.
By comparison, for wealthier households, although the overall 90th
percentile of net worth fell by 7% between 2005 and 2009, their share of
national wealth rose from 49% to 56%. Within the demographic groups,
Whites saw the smallest increase, with ownership share rising from 46% to
51%, while Asians rose from 44% to 61%, Blacks from 59% to 67%, and
Hispanics from 56% to 72%.
2. Income Inequality Trends
In addition to the wealth inequality picture discussed above, a 2016 study
demonstrates that income data too reinforces the portrait of increased wealth
inequality with a portrait of the highest wage earners pulling away from the rest.100

Source: Elise Gould, infra note 100.
99

Id.
See generally Elise Gould, Wage Inequality Continued its 35-year rise in 2015 (Econ. Policy
Inst., Briefing Paper #421, 2016), http://www.epi.org/files/2016/wage-inequality-2015.pdf.
100
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The dramatic segmentation we see between the highest wealth holders
and the rest is also reflected in data showing that the income of the highest wage
earners is growing faster than the lowest wage earners. This trend reflects the
higher wages earned by men.101 Gould shows “that the top 1 percent grew 149.4
percent, while the bottom 90 percent grew only 16.7 percent since 1979.”102
Thomas Piketty sees danger in the forces of divergence when “top
earners can quickly separate themselves from the rest by a wide margin. More
important, there is a set of forces of divergence associated with the process of
accumulation and concentration of wealth when growth is weak and the return
on capital is high. Piketty concludes that the divergence arising from accumulation and concentration of wealth is potentially more destabilizing, and
represents the principal threat to equal distribution of wealth over the long run.103
This portrait of accumulating wealth inequality and wage inequality
provide a dismal landscape of insurmountable, perpetual advantage to some
and perpetual disadvantage to others. When income becomes wealth, and
wealth can be translated into political power to shape the very rules of
engagement in markets without boundaries or limits, a disturbing portrait of
democratic instability emerges.
The Federal Reserve decision to exercise its statutory emergency
powers under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to provide neverbefore-seen infusions of liquidity to the unregulated financial sector that caused
the crisis without any public- regarding conditions placed on this cash transfer
constituted a massive redistribution of wealth to the financial sector away from
taxpayers and homeowners.
3. Political Capital: The Wealth Advantage in Writing the
Financial Rules
Existing frameworks fail to acknowledge that various forms of past
state-mandated discrimination against racial minorities have shaped the current
distribution of wealth and property, which in turn keep many people of color
from participating fully in a privately financed political system. By using the
First Amendment to undermine legislative restrictions on political contributions in cases like Citizens United,104 the courts effectively enshrine the
existing distribution of wealth as a baseline for political advantage.
101

Id. at 3.
Id. at 7 (citing Lawrence Mishel & Will Kimball, Wages for Top Earners Soared in 2014:
Fly Top 0.1 Percent, Fly, WORKING ECON. (Nov. 3, 2015, 12:36 PM), http://www.epi.org/
blog/wages-for-top-earners-soared-in-2014-fly-top-0-1-percent-fly/).
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PIKETTY, supra note 92, at 23.
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While income represents earnings in a particular year, wealth represents in part the accumulation of income over long periods of time. Wealthy
people, including people who earn no income but have inherited a great deal
of wealth, control significant resources that they may use to participate in the
current campaign finance process. Further, wealth affords opportunities that
significantly shape one’s future income and the income of one’s offspring.
Wealth is a “resource available for improving life chances, providing further
opportunities, securing prestige, passing status along to one’s family, and
influencing the political process.” As indicated above, racial disparities in
wealth and net worth are much broader than racial disparities in income. In
1995, the median net worth for white households ($61,000) was over eight
times greater than for African American households ($7400) and over twelve
times greater than for Latino households ($5000). In the campaign finance
context, net worth is germane because a family with a high net worth
presumably has fewer obligations and more disposable resources to spend on
politics. In other words, it has political capital.
The existing campaign finance system is a structural device that works
to perpetuate racial disparities. Privately financed politics, framed by a history
of racially discriminatory laws that have contributed to a present-day disparity
in control over resources, reproduce and exacerbate racial disparities in the
distribution of resources and political influence. These increasing disparities,
combined with numerical minority status, make people of color especially
vulnerable in the current political system. Raskin and Bonifaz criticize the
existing campaign finance system not only for the inequitable access it
provides to potential candidates and voters but also for the structural bias in
government decision making that results.
Then there is the matter of the wealth accruing to the financial sector,
which creates a synergistic political advantage in obtaining favorable legal
rules that aggravate the national inequality problem. We see the growing
dominance of the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE) sector in its
political contributions. FIRE has been the most prolific contributor to campaigns over the past 20 years. Since 1989, national senatorial candidates have
received a total of $431 million from the FIRE sector.105
In the 10 years leading up to the current economic crisis, the financial
sector spent $5 billion on political influence, according to a report by the
Essential Information and Consumer Education Foundation. From 1998 to
105

Paul Blumenthal, Senate Democrats, Republicans Raced to Raise Money from Finance,
Insurance, Real Estate Sector in 2009, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Apr. 13, 2010, 4:09 PM)
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2010/04/13/senate-democrats-republicans-raced-toraise-money-from-finance-insurance-real-estate-sector-in-2009/.

Vol. 2:1]

The Hidden Structures of Inequality

137

2008, investment firms, commercial banks, hedge funds, real estate companies,
and insurance companies spent $1.725 billion on political contributions and
$3.4 billion on lobbyists.106
Much of the implementation of financial reform occurs at the agency
level under a Chevron107 deference standard that allows agencies wide latitude
to interpret statutes. Two significant Supreme Court campaign finance decisions,
Citizens United108 and McCutcheon,109 make the agency implementation
process especially vulnerable to the inevitable loophole industry dispensing
political contributions to change the rules or eliminate regulation altogether.
a. Financial Regulatory Arbitrage: Evidence of the Wealth
Advantage of the Financial Sector
.

The recent financial crisis hollowed out the core of American middleclass financial stability. In the wake of the financial crisis, household net worth
in the United States fell by 24%, for a loss of $16 trillion. Moreover, retirement
accounts, the largest class of financial assets, saw a steep drop in value, as did
house prices. These two classes of assets alone represent approximately 43% of
all household wealth. The losses during the principal crisis years, from 2007 to
2009, were devastating, “erasing almost two decades of accumulated prosperity,” in the words of the Federal Reserve itself.110 Beyond these direct household
balance-sheet losses, one out of every four homeowners were underwater by
2009 with mortgages worth less than the value of their homes. If we add in the
3.7 to 5 million foreclosures that forced Americans to move from the economic
and emotional stability of family homes, we see a portrait of dramatic financial
instability in the wake of the financial collapse. What’s more, the Federal
Reserve’s commitment to low interest rates, so beloved on Wall Street,111 has
prevented many families from rebuilding their wealth through interest on
savings. These “zero-bound” interest rates are an impediment to middle-class
recovery from the losses of the crisis.
106

Paul Blumenthal, Financial Sector Spent $5 Billion on Political Influence, SUNLIGHT
FOUND. (Mar. 4, 2009, 3:05PM) http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2009/03/04/financialsecotr-spent-5-billion-on-political-influence/.
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Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
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Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 315 (2010).
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McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 134 S.Ct. 1434, 1437 (2014).
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Binyamin Appelbaum, Family Net Worth Drops to Level of Early ‘90s, Fed Says, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 2012, https://nyti.ms/2kASpXW.
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See, e.g., William D. Cohan, Low Interest Rates Help Private- Equity Moguls and Hurt
Average Americans, NATION (Sept. 18, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/low-interestrates-help-private-equity-moguls-and-hurt-average-americans/ (explaining Wall Street investors’
affinity for near-zero rates).
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By contrast, the financial sector—the cause of the crisis—has prospered from adversity, growing to 9% of GDP by 2010 even as it has become
less efficient.112 This percentage is one of the highest shares of GDP in the past
half century and represents 29% of all profits in America.113 The financial
sector earns profits by pooling funds to bring net savers together with net
borrowers in financial contracts, a process known as intermediation.
Economist Thomas Philippon, of New York University, found that the
profits from intermediation grew from less than 2% of GDP in 1870 to nearly
6% before the economic crash of 1929.114 After World War II, financiers
gradually increased their share of the economy to 5% by 1980, close to what it
had been before the crash. The focused deregulatory agenda of the Reagan
administration and Alan Greenspan’s deregulatory passions at the helm of the
Fed from 1987 to 2006 swelled the balance sheets of financial firms to the high
point of 9% of GDP by 2010.115 Philippon writes:
[Today’s] trading activities are at least three times larger than at
any time in history, and though trading costs have decreased, the
costs of active fund management are large . . . . [I]nvestors spend
0.67% of asset value trying (in vain, by definition) to beat the
market.
In the absence of evidence that increased trading led to either
better prices or better risk sharing, I must conclude that the
finance industry’s share of GDP is about two percentage points
higher than it needs to be and that this represents an annual
misallocation of resources of about $280 billion for the United
States alone.116
112

Thomas Philippon, Finance vs. Wal-Mart: Why are Financial Services so Expensive?, in
RETHINKING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 235, 235 (Alan S. Binder et al., eds., 2012).
113
Kathleen Madigan, Like the Phoenix, U.S. Finance Profits Soar, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2011,
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2011/03/25/like-the-phoenix-u-s-finance-profits-soar.
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Philippon, supra note 112, at 236.
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See id. (“The cost of intermediation . . . shrinks to less than 4% in 1950, grows slowly to
5% in 1980, and then increases rapidly to almost 9% in 2010.”).
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Id. at 245 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). The return to investors did not match
the growth in the financial sector’s share of GDP. So what did investors get for their money?
According to Philippon’s findings, it is impossible to beat the market in part because of highfrequency trading that locks out the ordinary investor through sophisticated high-speed computer
transmission of orders with preferential cable and algorithmic access to the trading desks. See
generally Benjamin Landy, Graph: How the Financial Sector Consumed America’s Economic
Growth, CENTURY FOUNDATION (Feb. 25, 2013), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/graph-howthe-financial-sector-consumed-americas-economic-growth/.
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The return to investors did not match the growth in the financial sector’s
share of GDP. So what did investors get for their money? Philippon says it’s
impossible to beat the market in part because of high-frequency trading that locks
out the ordinary investor through sophisticated high-speed computer transmission of orders with preferential cable and algorithmic access to the trading desks.
Eric Gerding provides a persuasive account of the relationship between
boom and bust cycles in financial markets and regulatory arbitrage frenzies.117
Gerding argues that as bubbles form, there is increasing pressure on regulators
to deregulate financial markets, reduce enforcement initiatives, repeal or water
down regulations, and refuse to apply legal rules to financial innovations.118
Financial market actors seek “regulatory stimulus” to extend the profitable runup of the boom cycle through the relaxation of government oversight. This cycle,
Gerding argues, creates “regulatory instability.”119 In his account, the effectiveness of government oversight of financial markets decreases notably during
a bubble as regulators are besieged by lobbyists and industry advocates. The
sophisticated gaming of the rules begins in earnest when the wealth created by
the bubble makes it profitable to engage in creative risk-taking that skirts the law.
Financial regulatory arbitrage became a “blood sport” during the crisis,
according to Arthur Levitt, Former Securities and Exchange Commission
Chairman.120 Levitt describes the harassment campaigns to which agencies
with rigorous enforcement priorities were subjected:
“[O]nce word of a proposed regulation got out, industry lobbyists
would rush to complain to members of the congressional committee with jurisdiction over the financial activity at issue.”121
According to Levitt, these members would then “harass” the SEC with
frequent letters demanding answers to complex questions and appearances of
officials before Congress.122 These requests consumed much of the agency’s
time and discouraged it from making regulations. Levitt described it as “kind
of a blood sport to make the particular agency look stupid or inept or venal.”123
117
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Regulatory arbitrage is alive and well. On June 8, 2017, the House of
Representatives passed the Financial Choice Act to repeal major provisions of
the 2010 Dodd-Frank reforms.124 One provision essentially eliminates the
political autonomy of the head of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
by making the position subject to presidential appointment and removal.125
Another provision allows larger banks to exchange higher financial cushion
levels in exchange for elimination of several Dodd Frank regulations, such as
reducing the number of mandatory “stress tests” to predict whether they could
withstand extreme economic conditions without taxpayer bailouts.126
b. A Case Study of TruPS: Arbitrage Frenzy Continued
Even After the Crisis
The case of regulatory treatment of Trust Preferred Securities (TruPS)
is one important and highly profitable example of a sophisticated game of
financial regulatory arbitrage. These hybrid debt securities were used to dilute
the capital of bank holding companies (BHCs). After the crisis, the FDIC
found that banking organizations issuing TruPS failed at much higher rates
during the period of January 1, 2008 through November 5, 2010 than did
insured banks generally or insured banks in BHCs that did not issue TruPS.
The Fed approved this capital dilution strategy; the FDIC strenuously opposed
its use.127
To carry out this strategy, the BHC would set up a special purpose entity
(SPE) as a subsidiary that held only the junior subordinated debt (debenture)
issued by the BHC to the SPE. The SPE then issued common stock and TruPS.
The common stock was bought entirely by the BHC128 and the TruPS were sold
to investors. The cash raised from investors was then borrowed by the BHC,
with the debenture in the SPE, a long term subordinated note, provided in
exchange for the cash. The BHC paid interest on the debenture. The interest
payments were tax deductible as a debt payment for tax purposes.
124

Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong., https://www.congress.gov/115/
bills/hr10/BILLS-115hr10eh.pdf; Alan Rappeport, Bill to Erase Some Dodd-Frank Banking
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Letter from Donald E. Powell to Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys. 3-9 (July 2, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Powell Letter] (providing, on
behalf of the FDIC, strong objections to treating trust preferred securities as Tier 1 capital).
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This accounting trick allows the TruPS to be treated as a minority interest of the BHC and
consolidate the balance sheet of the subsidiary SPE and count it as Tier 1 capital. Powell
Letter, supra note 127, at 2; Todd H. Eveson, Financial and Banking Holding Company
Issuance of Trust Preferred Securities, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 315, 323–329 (2002).
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Source: Todd H. Eveson, Financial and Banking Holding Company
Issuance of Trust Preferred Securities, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 315, 325
(2002).

The debt issued by the BHC was in the form of a debenture. Filed under
the Securities Act of 1933, most of them fell under the exception of
registration.129 For the regulatory arbitrage to work, the features of the
debenture had to mimic the characteristic of common equity: unsecured,
subordinated to the rights of other creditors, with long maturities (30 years) and
long periods of deferral. Accordingly, the TruPS issued by the SPE had to be
exactly equal to the aggregate face value of the BHC debentures it held. It also
mirrored the terms (frequency, amount) of the debentures so that interest
payments on the debentures received by the trust were immediately declared
as a dividend to the holders of the trust. The SPE did nothing to the funds that
flowed into it other than pass them through to its security holders.130
129

“Because of the 144A status of TruPS CDOs, however, trustees do not allow Intex to
make all information available to analysts as they do with public deals. Most important,
analysts not specifically investing in TruPS CDOs generally do not know the issuer of TruPS
going into each pool.” Larry Cordell, Michael Hopkins & Yilin Huang, The Trust Preferred
CDO Market: From Start to (Expected) Finish 16 (Research Department, Fed. Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia, Working Paper No. 11-22, 2011).
130
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In order to formalize the promise that funds paid into the trust as
interest on the debentures would be paid out to the holders of the TruPS, a
Preferred Securities Guarantee was signed. This particular guarantee served
two functions: (1) bridge the gap in privity between the holding company and
the eventual holders of the TruPS (in large scale public offering the BHC
executes a guarantee for the benefit of a guarantee trustee that acts in the
collective interest of the holders of the TruPS) and (2) avoid the classification
as an investment company under the 1940 Investment Company Act.131
For the BHC, issuing TruPS meant cheap equity: while the cost of an
initial common equity offering was between 11% and 7%, the cost of preferred
stocks was 2.79%.132 Additionally, the issuing entity did not dilute the existing
shareholders’ power because it did not grant shares with traditional voting
rights.133 Finally, the debt quality of the security allowed the BHC to treat the
interest paid to the SPE as tax deductible.134 Thus, the true economic substance
of the TruPS was that the BHC was financing itself with subordinated debt,
responding more to a debt obligation than a form of equity.135
For investors (typically institutional, fixed-income investors, hedge
funds and off-balance sheet Structured Investment Vehicles) TruPS represented
a higher yield than straight debt issued by investment-grade borrowers. They
provided a protection during bankruptcy compared to common equity because
investors were paid before common stockholders, and the investors’ portfolios
(of the ones subject to regulatory supervision) were deemed more stable.136
On October 21, 1996,137 the Federal Reserve expressly authorized the
BHC to include TruPS as up to 25% of core capital for their Tier 1 regulatory
capital. Immediately thereafter, most of the large BHCs issued TruPS up to the
permitted limit of Tier 1 capital138 and the issuance remained steady until 2000
when Salomon Smith Barney issued the first TruPS Collateralized Debt
Obligation (CDO).139
131
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TruPS CDOs represented an opportunity for small and medium size
BHCs (unrated or poorly-rated) because TruPS were too expensive to issue on
their own. Conversely, if TruPS of small banks were put together in a big pool,
tranched and sold off as rated bonds to investors, the costs could be reduced
significantly and the investors would rely on the high ratings.140
Fitch reported that since the year 2000, 1,813 banking entities issued
TruPS that were purchased by TruPS CDOs making a total of approximately
$38 billion.141 Additionally, to provide most of the deals’ inputs, small banks
also loaded up on the structured securities they produced.142 The express
authorization of regulators for insured institutions to invest in their own
TruPS143 created another layer of interconnectedness between financial
institutions that created systemic risk once the crisis ignited. As the FDIC
recounted in 2010, “banking organizations issuing TruPS failed at much higher
rates during the period January 1, 2008 through November 5, 2010 than did
insured banks generally or insured banks in BHCs that did not issue TruPS.144
Beginning in 2003, after the Enron scandal, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (F.A.S.B.), a self-regulatory organization, began reviewing
the consolidation rules under Accounting Research Bulletin No. 51, and the
treatment of Special Purpose Vehicles. This revision led to the issuance of FIN
46 and FIN 46R; thereafter, the BHC must reflect the deeply subordinated note
issued to the SPE on its consolidated balance sheet, but it could not report the
TruPS as a minority interest in a consolidated subsidiary.145 The new rules
caused uncertainty among the financial institutions about how the Federal
Reserve would treat these securities in capital requirements. However, the
140

See generally Jeff Horwitz, TruPS Leave Buyers in Limbo, 174 AM. BANKER 1 (determining
that high credit rating of TruPS CDOs was based on the premise that “geographically diverse
banks had never defaulted at significant rates”). Therefore, rating agencies required only a thin
buffer of collateral, barely 2%, to protect a deal’s investment-grade tranches. Id.
141
FDIC SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS, supra note 17, at 4.
142
See Cordell et al., supra note 118, at 3–4 (“Experts have estimated that banks have purchased
some $12 billion of TruPS CDOs, mostly in mezzanine classes of the CDOs, which means that
banks became a primary investor in the debt of the banking industry.”).
143
See OCC, Interpretative Letter #777, 12 U.S.C. 24(7) 92 (Apr. 1997) (authorizing national
banks to invest in TruPS if they meet the definition of “investment securities” according to
regulation 12 C.F.R. Section 1.2(e), limit: 10% of capital and surplus (as a Type III security));
FDIC, Financial Institution Letter FIL-16-99 (Feb. 19, 1999) [hereinafter FDIC Letter] (“[Section
24 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and the corresponding regulations] do not restrict an
insured state bank’s authority under state law to invest in trust preferred stock.” The investment
must come within the same definition of investment security used by the OCC. FDIC regulated
institutions are not subject to the 10% limit); OTS, Third Bulletin 73(a) (Dec. 18, 2001)
(explaining that thrifts may invest in TruPS up to 15% of its total capital).
144
FDIC SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS, supra note 17, at 14.
145
Powell Letter, supra note 127, at 2.
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uncertainty was resolved very quickly when, on May 6, 2004, the Federal
Reserve proposed and then approved a regulation allowing the TruPS to
maintain the Tier 1 status and only lowered from 25% to 15% the limit of
TruPS allowable in Tier 1 for internationally active holding companies.146

Source: Nicole Boyson, Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René Stulz, Why do Banks
Practice Regulatory Arbitrage? Evidence from Usage of Trust Preferred
Securities at 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19984,
2014), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w19984.pdf

As a consequence, TruPS and TruPS CDOs grew, reaching a total
outstanding of $140 billion in the first quarter of 2010. Nearly 90% of the banks
had some TruPS in their capital structures, having issued TruPS themselves or
having bought other banks’ TruPS as investments.
As Nicole Boyson et al observe, “it was more common for banks to use
[TruPS] as a [marginal funding mechanism, so that] when they made acquisitions or [had] considerable internal growth that would have reduced their Tier
1 capital ratios, [they] used [TruPS] instead of equity to maintain their prior Tier
1 capital ratios.”147 BHC clearly used TruPS to pursue aggressive internal and
external growth. And while most research leading to the crisis painted a picture
of very safe and sound banks relying on the fact that banks were holding more
capital than required, they failed to uncover the true quality of BHC capital.
The fundamental concept to understand about this particular regulatory
arbitrage that BHCs gamed, was that this complex transaction raised a significant issue of the insured banks’ safety and soundness. Tier 1 capital is considered
146
147

Id. at 1.
Id. at 4.
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a core capital element, fully available to absorb losses while the banking
organization is under stress. TruPS definitively did not have the qualities of a
core capital element. As the FDIC had concluded, these securities were a liability
of the parent BHC and—in spite of their characteristics—they could not absorb
losses as equity does and therefore could not count as Tier 1 capital.148
Significantly, the BHC’s diluted and worthless capital put pressure on
FDIC-insured subsidiaries. “[I]nvestors in trust preferred securities have a
contractual right to full payment of principal and interest and, if such payments
are deferred, their claim on the trust both cumulates and compounds. The
requirement to service this obligation can place undue pressure on other entities
within a BHC, including FDIC-insured bank subsidiaries, regardless of whether such payments are in the subsidiary bank’s financial interest. While the
ability to defer dividend payments may provide an organization with temporary
relief, there is strong market pressure to keep such payments current, or to bring
them current in the event of payment deferral.”149
Thus, it is not surprising to see studies where TruPS usage was linked
to poorer performance and more probability of default, observing patterns of
riskier behavior among the TruPS users. As the FDIC notes, “[t]he banking
industry has experienced significant write-downs of mezzanine bond-holdings.
Over the past two years, the failure of federally insured depository institutions
was due largely, or in part, to their investment in TruPS CDOs.”150
Finally, it is not surprising to discover that banks with a higher
proportion of TruPS in their Tier 1 capital were significantly more likely to
receive funds from the Capital Purchase Program, a part of the Troubled Asset
Relief Program which cost taxpayers $205 billion between October 2008 and
December 2009.151
148

See Powell Letter, supra note 127, at 7 (“Even in the absence of deferral, trust preferred
securities are ‘permanent’ only in the sense of being binding long-term commitments by the
organization to make regular fixed dividend payments for the life of the debenture, which is
typically 30 years or less. Trust preferred securities cannot absorb losses on a going-concern
basis, because they give rise to a fixed liability that can only be avoided in the event of
default. Deferral of dividends can conserve cash flow for five years but this would not offset
any losses as the dividend obligation continues to accrue.”).
149
Id.
150
FDIC SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS, supra note 17. See also Powell Letter, supra note 127, at
6 (“In times of financial distress at the banking level, the debt service requirements of trust
preferred securities has the potential to force the bank to increase its risk profile in order to
increase cash liquidity for dividend payments, divert income from critical internal investment
needs, and to take other actions that lead them away from safe and sound banking
practices.”); FDIC SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS, supra note 17.
151
See PEIYI YU & BAC VAN LUU, LESSONS FROM THE COLLAPSE IN HYBRID CAPITAL
SECURITIES 23 (“Institutions that had almost used up their allowance of innovative Tier 1
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In the naïve belief that after the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and, more specifically, Section 171 (generally
referred to as the Collins Amendment), banks will now be safe and sound—and
that the hybrid securities will never again be part of the core capital elements of
insured banks and bank holding companies—new regulations keep allowing this
toxic instrument to survive and propagate, achieving levels of financial leverage
and activities impermissible otherwise.152
II. HOW DID THE FED CONTRIBUTE TO THE INEQUALITY PROBLEM?
Did the Federal Reserve’s aggressive pre-crisis deregulation of capital
requirements, its off-balance-sheet permissions, and its enthusiasm for
complexly structured financial instruments have an impact on post-crisis
economic inequality trends?153 Few scholars have asked this basic question.154
The Fed is the most powerful economic institution in the world. A close
examination of its recent policies will shed some light on the question of the
connection between Fed policies and the growing problem of economic
inequality. This paper seeks to stimulate that necessary conversation.
Former Fed Governor Sarah Bloom Raskin155 was the intellectual
leader of the effort to bring inequality analysis to the fore in Fed thinking,
securities issuance (and thus had little leeway to issue new securities) were more likely to
require a government bailout.”).
152
See Joint Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Agencies Approve Interim
Final Rule Authorizing Retention of Interests in and Sponsorship of Collateralized Debt
Obligations Backed Primarily by Bank-Issued Trust Preferred Securities, (Jan. 14, 2014)
(“Five federal agencies on Tuesday approved an interim final rule to permit banking entities
to retain interests in certain collateralized debt obligations backed primarily by trust preferred
securities (TruPS CDOs) from the investment prohibitions of section 619 of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, known as the Volcker rule.”).
153
Frank Partnoy & Lynn E. Turner, Bring Transparency to Off-Balance Sheet Accounting,
in MAKE MARKETS BE MARKETS 85 (2010).
154
An important exception is the work of economist, Gary A Dymski, who argued that the
root causes of the subprime crisis were (1) the systemic exclusion of racial minorities from
participation in mortgage-finance, (2) the creation of new financial assets designed to generate
net income for banks, and (3) the “unique global macroeconomic position” of the United States.
Gary A. Dymski, Racial Exclusion and the Political Economy of the Subprime Crisis, 17 HIST.
MATERIALISM 149, 150–51 (2009). I discussed the question of redistribution up in my paper
presented to the LatCrit Conference in 2013. In addition, there is a growing chorus of
journalistic commentary in the blogs and within both the conservative and liberal think tanks
that does focus on the Fed as a vehicle of wealth redistribution that fueled inequality.
155
Sarah Bloom Raskin was sworn in as the first woman Deputy Secretary of Treasury in
2014, after she stepped down as a member of the Board of Governors. See Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Sarah Bloom Raskin Sworn in as Deputy Secretary (Apr. 11,
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through a series of intellectually stimulating speeches and policy papers.156
Raskin has repeatedly explored the impact of monetary and bank regulatory
policy on unemployment, economic marginalization, and financial
vulnerability among millions of moderate- and low-income Americans. In an
April 2013 speech she addressed “an issue of growing saliency that
macroeconomic models used at central banks and by academics have not
traditionally emphasized—specifically, how such economic marginalization
and financial vulnerability, associated with stagnant wages and rising
inequality, contributed to the run-up to the financial crisis and how such
marginalization and vulnerability could be relevant in the current recovery.”157
By contrast, Janet Yellen, the new Federal Reserve chair, succinctly
endorsed conventional macroeconomic wisdom about the role of the Fed in
economic inequality. During her November 2013 confirmation testimony, she
told the senators:
Economists have spent a lot of time trying to understand what
is responsible for widening inequality. Many of the underlying
factors are things that are outside the Federal Reserve’s ability
to address . . . . There is a lot of research, a lot of debate about
exactly what the causes of this problem are, perhaps having to
2015) (describing the swearing-in ceremony of Raskin and previous position on the Board
of Governors); Annie Lowrey, Raskin Would Be the First Female Deputy at Treasury, N.Y.
TIMES, July 31, 2013, https://nyti.ms/2kD2WSp (describing Raskin’s position as the first
female deputy).
156
See generally Sarah Bloom Raskin, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks at the National Community Reinvestment Coalition Annual Conference (Mar. 22,
2013) (discussing current recovery’s job creation; “how the absence of a substantial number
of new high-paying jobs, when combined with changes in the landscape for financial
services, affects access generally to affordable, sustainable credit”; and “the monetary,
supervisory, and regulatory touchpoints in which the situation and prospect of low- and
moderate-income working Americans can be addressed”); Sarah Bloom Raskin, Member,
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at Building a Financial Structure for a
More Stable and Equitable Economy, the 22nd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on the
State of the U.S. and World Economies (Apr. 18, 2013) (“[E]xamining . . . . how such
economic marginalization and financial vulnerability, associated with stagnant wages and
rising inequality, contributed to the run-up to the financial crisis and how such marginalization and vulnerability could be relevant in the current recovery.”); Sarah Bloom Raskin,
Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Society of Government
Economists and the National Economists Club (May 16, 2013) (“[I offer] my assessment of
recent economic developments and the economic outlook, and . . . the actions that the Federal
Reserve has been taking, in light of its view of developments and the outlook, to support the
economic recovery.”).
157
See Raskin, supra note 156.
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do in part with the nature of technological change, with . . .
globalization and the decline of unions. The solutions involve
a multitude of things including . . . early childhood education.
What can the Fed do? (emphasis added) We cannot change all
of those trends.158
Yellen shares the liberal economic view that while inequality is bad,
the Federal Reserve is not responsible for the primary drivers of this
inequality: education, technological innovation, and globalization. In the
transcripts and minutes of the 2007-9 meetings of the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC), Yellen shows her talent as a prescient, reliable evaluator
of the proper balance the Fed should bring to evaluating the conflicting
economic signals of inflation and unemployment. Her empathic observations
about the human toll of unemployment reveal a genuine personal commitment
to the Fed’s statutory mandate to lower unemployment, and especially to
address the devastating effects of long-term unemployment.159 In a paper coauthored with, Nobel Prize–winning economist George Akerlof, her husband,
they write that “[p]olicy makers should be compelled to take action given the
serious costs of long-term unemployment when overall unemployment is
already high. A week of unemployment is worse when it is experienced as
part of a longer spell.”160
Thomas Piketty argues that the Fed is in charge of redistribution of
wealth:
[I]t is important to realize that central banks do not create
wealth as such; they redistribute it. . . . Rapid execution is the
principal strength of the monetary authorities. The weakness
of central banks is clearly their limited ability to decide who
should receive loans in what amount and for what duration.161
158

To be fair, it is conventional wisdom that nominees for high-level federal positions hew
closely to the conventional wisdom of the agency for which they have been nominated.
Therefore, Yellen’s answer is reasonable in the circumstance. However, it does provide a
concise statement of Fed orthodoxy on inequality. Yellen Nomination, supra note 1, at 32.
159
See, e.g., FED. RES. SYS., MEETING OF THE FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE ON
SEPTEMBER 22-23, 2009 95–96 (2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/file
s/FOMC20090923meeting.pdf (providing Ms. Yellen’s observations on the state of financial
markets at the time).
160
Craig Torres & Joshua Zumbrun, Yellen’s Focus on Unemployment Adopted by Fed After
Crisis, BLOOMBERG BUS., Apr. 25, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201304-25/yellen-s-unemployment-focus-adopted-by-bernanke-fed-after-crisis.
161
PIKETTY, supra note 92, at 550, 552.

Vol. 2:1]

The Hidden Structures of Inequality

149

The problem is that central banks lack the democratic legitimacy. Piketty further argues that “central banks . . . can redistribute wealth quickly and
massively, but they can also be very wrong in their choice of targets.”162 Piketty
concludes that the problem is not one of technical impossibility, but of
democratic governance.
Despite the laudable empathy for the unemployed, Yellen’s stance
reveals critical analytic failures. During the period leading up to the financial
crisis of 2008, the Federal Reserve was a powerful matrix for economic
inequality through both action and inaction. My argument here relies upon
recognizing a structural continuity between the Fed’s pre-crisis deregulatory
agenda and its now legendary post-crisis intervention. The pre-crisis deregulation
set the stage for the magnitude of the uncontrolled, unanticipated collapse of
the interdependent networks created by that deregulatory agenda.
A. Cognitive Narrowness: Framing the Narrative of Miscalculation
“Some important lessons emerge from the story [of the Great Depression].
One lesson is that ideas are critical.”163
- Ben Bernanke, Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve
“People who belong to a group that makes decisions have a tendency to selfcensor and not express ideas that don’t conform to the perceived professional
standard. They’re too professional. They are not creative and imaginative in
their approach”164
- Robert Shiller, 2013 Nobel Laureate for Economic Sciences
The Federal Reserve decision-making process and output displayed a
persistent “cognitive narrowness” before, during, and after the crisis. In my
view, the dynamic pattern of “interdependent network theory,” developed first
in physics and biology, provides a powerful tool for explaining the suddenness
of the financial collapse and the amplification of the impact beyond the
subprime mortgage market.
162

Id. at 552.
Money, Gold, and the Great Depression, supra note 187.
164
Robert Stowe England, Robert Shiller Says Markets Have Become More Prone to
Bubbles, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/
article/3313677/asset-management-macro/robert-shiller-says-markets-have-become-moreprone-to-bubbles.html (providing excerpts from the author’s interview with Robert Schiller).
163
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Former Chair Ben Bernanke’s testimony to the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission (FCIC) reveals the devastating impact of cognitive narrowness at
the very top of the Fed. Bernanke testified, on one hand, that the Fed could not
have anticipated the financial crisis or its severity because the crisis was “a
perfect storm,” an unpredictable Act of God. On the other hand, in response to
a question about the Fed’s lack of aggressiveness in regulating the mortgage
market during the steep ascent of housing prices, Bernanke admitted that the
failure to rein in abusive lending practices “was the most severe failure of the
Fed in this particular episode.”165
In this section, I offer a novel explanation of how the Fed became a
matrix of inequality. In my discussion, I rely on the two concepts mentioned
above, concepts that have received scant attention in the vast literature of legal
scholarship on the financial crisis. First, I explain cognitive narrowness and then
explore its impact on Federal Reserve decision-making. Second, I introduce
interdependent network theory166 as a useful conceptual tool to explain how Fed
policy before the crisis created several interdependent networks that converged
beyond its cognitively narrowed perception of the growing risk. The
interdependent networks began forming on an indispensable foundation of
aggressive deregulation that included both affirmative permissions to shift risk
165

FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 9, at xvii.
See generally PRASANNA GAI, SYSTEMIC RISK: THE DYNAMICS OF MODERN FINANCIAL
SYSTEMS (2013). I have relied on the work of Gai, in the developing field of financial
network theory. Gai’s contribution to the finance literature in this work has been summarized
as follows:
166

This book opens new ground in the study of financial crises. It treats the
financial system as a complex adaptive system and shows how lessons
from network disciplines - such as ecology, epidemiology, and statistical
mechanics - shed light on our understanding of financial stability. Using
tools from network theory and economics, it suggests that financial
systems are robust-yet-fragile, with knife-edge properties that are greatly
exacerbated by the hoarding of funds and the fire sale of assets by banks.
The book studies the damaging network consequences of the failure of
large inter-connected institutions, explains how key funding markets can
seize up across the entire financial system, and shows how the pursuit of
secured finance by banks in the wake of the global financial crisis can
generate systemic risks. The insights are then used to model banking
systems calibrated to data to illustrate how financial sector regulators are
beginning to quantify financial system stress.
Oxford Univ. Press, Description of SYSTEMIC RISK: THE DYNAMICS OF MODERN
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, https://global.oup.com/academic/product/systemic-risk-9780
199544493.
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to off-balance-sheet dark zones and inaction in the failure to police the
spreading virus of subprime and racial exploitation in mortgage lending. The
interdepend-dent network framework is useful in explaining how cognitive
narrowness and race were linked in an interdependent set of “nodes”167 that
came together during the crisis, because it offers a physical image of the catastrophic, cascading results that produce exponentially large failures exceeding
the sum of the individual parts.
1. Key Federal Reserve Actions that Increased Economic Inequality
In what follows, I identify three major categories of Federal Reserve
action that increased economic inequality during the financial crisis of 2008:
a. Category I: Deregulation
First and foremost, the Federal Reserve undertook a program of systematic deregulation and non-enforcement of legal rules that would have prevented
the proliferation of the unsustainable subprime mortgages that formed the heart
of the crisis.
Second, the Federal Reserve adopted a series of explicit off-balancesheet permissions that allowed regulated banks and their holding companies to
move the origination and distribution system for home loans off the bank
balance sheet into unregulated entities that facilitated the growth of a massive
“shadow” banking sector. Hidden from government view, this shadow sector
was especially vulnerable to systemic panics and runs because it lacked three
indispensable safeguards that stabilized the traditional banking system:
regulated capital cushions, transparent transactions, and primary supervisory
oversight of the quality of its transactions.168
167

I use the term “nodes” in the context of the 2008 financial crisis to capture the list of
interactive relationships of off balance sheet deregulation, interconnection between formal
banks and the shadow bank system consisting of maturity transformation through short term
financing provided by money market funds and asset backed commercial paper facilities.
168
Fed Governor Tarullo has taken the lead on the discussion of what regulatory approach
is best to address the systemic risks arising from the interconnected, dark balance sheets that
remain in the shadow sector six years after the crisis. Tarullo has spoken often about this
development. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks at the Americans for Financial Reform and Economic Policy Institute Conference
(Nov. 22, 2013) (“Support provided for shadow banking activities may be either explicit or
implicit. In some cases, there are explicit contractual provisions for credit enhancements and
liquidity support. In other cases, the support is implicit, based on a bank’s historical pattern
of providing support or a belief among investors that a bank will provide support to maintain
the value of its franchise. In the lead-up to the crisis, explicit and implicit commitments by
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b. Category II: Cognitive Narrowness
Cognitive narrowness provides a comprehensive explanation of the
Fed’s failure to recognize that the pervasive interconnectedness of the invisible
shadow sector and the formal sector posed an imminent threat to the stability of
the entire global financial system when housing prices began to decline in 2005.
Most scholarly analyses,169 government investigations,170 and post-crisis autopsies171 have concluded, in hindsight, that pervasive interconnection between the
regulated banking firms to shadow banks often combined to create the assumption that the
liabilities of such entities were risk-free. This perception led to an underpricing of the risks
embedded in these money-like instruments, making them an artificially cheap source of
funding and creating an oversupply of these instruments that contributed to systemic risk.”);
Craig Torres & Jeff Kearns, Tarullo Backs More Capital for Firms Relying on Repo Funds,
BLOOMBERG, (Nov. 22, 2013) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-22/tarullo-backsmore-capital-for-firms-relying-on-repo-funding.html (“Shadow banking, including money
market funds and off balance sheet investment vehicles, grew $5 trillion last year to about
$71 trillion, the Financial Stability Board, a global financial policy group based in Basel,
Switzerland, said last week.”); Emily Stephenson & Douwe Miedema, Fed’s Tarullo: Shortterm Bank Funding Should Be Top Regulatory Focus, REUTERS, Sept. 20, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/20/us-feds-tarullo-idUSBRE98J0OY20130920
(“[Regulators are] beefing up capital requirements and cracking down on short-term funding
[and] are looking at ways to prevent banking activities from migrating away from regulated
entities and into so-called ‘shadow banks.’”).
169
See generally Ricardo J. Caballero, & Alp Simsek, Fire Sales in a Model of Complexity (Mass.
Inst. of Tech., Working Paper No. 15479, 2009); Rama Cont et al., Network Structure and
Systemic Risk in Banking Systems, OPUS FINANCE 1; Prasanna Gai et al., Complexity,
Concentration and Contagion, 58 J. MONETARY ECON. 453 (2011); Maarten R.C.van Oordt &
Chen Zhou, Systematic Risk under Adverse Market Conditions (De Nederlandsche Bank and
Erasmus University Rotterdam, Working Paper, 2011); Nikola Tarashev et al., The Systemic
Importance of Financial Institutions, BIS QUARTERLY REV. 75 (2009); Lev Ratnovski, Bank
Liquidity Regulation and the Lender of Last Resort (Bank of England and University of
Amsterdam, Working Paper 2007); Rama Cont et al, Too Interconnected to Fail: Contagion and
Systemic Risk in Financial Networks, (Columbia Univ. & Université de Paris, 2009); Franklin
Allen et al, Financial Connections and Systemic Risk (Wharton, 2010); Viral V. Acharya et al,
Measuring Systemic Risk (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper 10-02, 2010).
170
See generally CARL LEVIN, U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS: COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, WALL
STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE MAJORITY AND
MINORITY STAFF REPORT (2011).
171
See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-180, FINANCIAL CRISIS
LOSSES AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT (2013); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 14-18, GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR BANK HOLDING
COMPANIES: STATUTORY CHANGES TO LIMIT FUTURE SUPPORT ARE NOT YET FULLY
IMPLEMENTED (2013); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 10-16, TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM: ONE YEAR LATER: ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO ADDRESS REMAINING
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY CHALLENGES (2009).
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formal banking system and the shadow sector led to an exponential increase in
the scope of the damage to the financial sector and the overall economy, but I go
beyond the consensus structural analysis of the causes of the crisis.
I argue that an important deficit in Federal Reserve leadership172 was
its blindness173 to the nation’s history of racial discrimination in housing.174
This lack of historical understanding proved lethal. The crisis-period
transcripts of the meetings of the FOMC show that the Board repeatedly
underestimated the near cataclysmic effects of the looming global subprime
crisis because of its deeply mistaken belief that if the housing bubble burst, the
effect would be an easily contained recession, on the scale of the collapse of
the asset bubble of the Silicon Valley technology start-ups. The dot-com
comparison is one significant marker of how far afield the limited cultural and
social imagination of the Fed would carry it from recognizing the role of
racially discriminatory lending in the American housing market.
Chairman Bernanke’s memoir captures an important dimension of this
blindness. Bernanke recognized that although the Fed saw the pieces of the
puzzle that would create the financial crisis, “but we failed to understand—
‘failed to imagine’ might be a better phrase—how those pieces would fit
together to produce a financial crisis.”175
c. Category III: The Fed’s Post-Crisis Bailouts and
Emergency Lending
The Fed’s crisis response “saved” the global economy by distributing
$12 trillion in emergency lending to non-banks and nothing directly to
homeowners to enable them to restructure flawed mortgage loans and remain
in their homes. This decision contributed to the growth of inequality after the
172

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is a body of the United States Federal
Reserve System. Composed of twelve members (the seven members of the Board of
Governors, the president of the New York Fed and four other Reserve Bank presidents who
serve on a rotating basis), the FOMC is in charge of carrying out one of the most important
roles in the U.S. economy: the formulation and conduct of monetary policy through open
market operations (buying and selling of federal government bonds in order to influence the
money supply and interest rate).
173
See, for example, my discussion of Federal Reserve lack of knowledge regarding history
of racial discrimination in housing, infra notes 7–11.
174
Gordon, supra note 40, at 186; see Ben Brantley, No Rest For the Weary: ‘Raisin in the
Sun’ Brings Denzel Washington Back to Broadway, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2014, at C1
(referring to a Twitter comment that claimed that Lorraine Hansberry’s iconic play about the
African American longing for home ownership should be an indispensable component of the
orientation for every new Fed Board member).
175
BEN S. BERNANKE, THE COURAGE TO ACT 82 (2015).
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crisis by draining wealth in housing from homeowners in foreclosure while
distributing wealth to the financial sector.176 According to one estimate, real
household wealth declined by $19 trillion between July 2007 and January
2009, and the Fed reported that median family net worth fell 38.8%. By March
2009, retirement savings had lost an estimated $3.4 trillion, 40% of their
value.177 For those nearing retirement, these losses were irretrievable.
2. Monetary Theory, Bank Regulation,178 and Ben’s Promise
Milton Friedman’s ninetieth birthday celebration, on Friday November
8, 2002, was a grand intellectual occasion for the orthodox branch of the
economics profession. The University of Chicago invited a distinguished
group of economists, including Nobel Laureate James Heckman and Federal
Reserve Board member Benjamin Bernanke. The fete and conference were
held at the architecturally important Max Palevsky Cinema, with elegant red
velvet seating on two levels for 375 attendees, in Ida Noyes Hall on the
East 59th Street side of campus.
Ben Bernanke’s speech at 3 p.m. that day was a highly anticipated endof-the- birthday celebration and conference that welcomed Nobel Prize winner
Friedman for a “rare return to campus” from his home in California. The
176

Mark Pittman & Bob Ivory, Financial Rescue Nears GDP as Pledges Top $12.8 Trillion,
BLOOMBERG, Mar. 31, 2009.
177
Atkinson, Luttrell & Rosenblum, supra note 18.
178
See Donna Borak, Will The Fed's Capital Rules Interfere with Monetary Policy?,
AMERICAN BANKER (Apr. 17, 2014), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/will-the-fedscapital-rules-interfere-with-monetary-policy, for a discussion of how the overlap and
potential conflicts between monetary and bank regulation policy has only recently come to
attention as reported in the financial press.
The Fed's banking rule writers in years past paid little, if any, attention to
the potential fallout of their efforts on monetary policy or the broader
economy, perhaps making a small mention of how a regulatory change
could result in fewer loans. But nowadays Fed officials are repeatedly
drawing links between financial stability and monetary policy, including
which is better at spotting or reducing asset-price bubbles. Fed Chairman
Ben Bernanke set that line of thinking in motion, and new Chair Janet
Yellen has made balancing monetary policy and bank supervision the
central bank's No. 3 priority behind the two disciplines themselves.
“Nobody talked about the link between financial stability and monetary
policy,” Petrou said. “Academics didn't see it, and the Fed didn't
understand it, and so nobody thought about it. We learned the hard way
how intertwined financial stability and monetary policy can be.
Id.
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excitement that afternoon centered on the fact that Bernanke’s 1983 American
Economics Review article, “The Non-monetary Effects of the Financial Crisis
in the Propagation of the Great Depression,”179 was an important revision that
built on Friedman and Schwartz’ monetary theory of the causes of the
Depression.180 As a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve,
Bernanke had both ideas and the power to implement his ideas. Bernanke’s
scholarly, well-researched speech that afternoon catalogued Friedman’s
contributions to macroeconomic thinking.181
The speech is most remembered, however, for Bernanke’s closing, a
promise to Friedman and his longtime collaborator, Anna Schwartz: “I would
like to say to Milton and Anna: regarding the Great Depression. You’re right,
we did it. We’re very sorry. But thanks to you, we won’t do it again.”182
By all accounts, Bernanke strove gallantly to keep that promise as the
Chair and intellectual leader of the Board during the crisis. Bernanke’s
reference to “we did it” in the now famous “promise” refers to two schools of
thought within the Hoover Administration after the stock market crash and the
subsequent dramatic loss of productivity and banking stability. The passive
liquidationists, led by Secretary of the Treasury, Andrew Mellon, and the Fed,
argued that the government should not intervene in a banking panic because
the disruption and purging of the economy, no matter how painful to innocent
citizens, were necessary to restore the balance within the capitalist economic
system. Hoover’s memoirs assign this infamous phrase to Mellon: “Liquidate
labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, and liquidate real estate.”183
179

See generally Ben S. Bernanke, The Non-monetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the
Propagation of the Great Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 257 (1983).
180
Bernanke was careful to make clear in the birthday speech that his own work on the
Depression did not reject Friedman and Schwartz’ basic monetary thesis that “the contraction
is in fact a tragic testimonial to the importance of monetary forces.” As I have always tried
to make clear, my argument for nonmonetary influences of bank failures is simply an
embellishment of the Friedman-Schwartz story; it in no way contradicts the basic logic of
their analysis. Ben S. Bernanke, Governor of the Bd. of Directors, Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech
on Milton Friedman’s Ninetieth Birthday, Remarks at the Conference to Honor Milton
Friedman (Nov. 8, 2002).
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
HERBERT HOOVER, THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT HOOVER: THE GREAT DEPRESSION 19291941 30 (1953). Note that Hoover’s attribution of Mellon’s hardline liquidationist quote has
recently been challenged by banking scholar Larry White, who counts Hoover’s memoirs as
revisionist history, designed to polish Hoover’s irreparably damaged presidential legacy by
assigning the most heartless version of the now widely discredited liquidationist theory of
monetary policy to his Secretary of the Treasury, Andrew Mellon. Lawrence H. White, Did
Hayek and Robbins Deepen the Great Depression?, 40 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 751,
758-59 (2008).
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For liquidationists, panics and recessions were a good way to purge the
excess credit spilling out after an imprudent credit binge, like the stock market
speculation that preceded the Crash of 1929. President Hoover aligns himself
with the second school of the opposing forces that lost the liquidationist battle at
the Fed. Hoover argued that he favored “cushioning” the impacts of the collapse
by government action, such as creating the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
designed to save the railroads, and to provide liquidity to banks to cushion the
disruption of depositor panics. Hoover said that he favored protecting unemployed workers, farmers and other small businesses from bankruptcies.184
The “liquidationist theory” carried the day, and in 1928 the Fed decided
to begin a series of interest rate increases. Liquidationists believed that after a
credit-fueled bubble the central bank should mop up the excess credit in the
economy by raising interest rates. Today this approach is widely mocked as a
foolish policy choice that damaged the US economy, leading to 25% unemployment, the collapse of the U.S. banking system and a prolonged disruption
of the economic security of the nation.185
Instead of the liquidationist theory that captivated the Depression Fed
and Mellon,186 the Greenspan-Bernanke Fed was committed to the largely
discredited ideas of radical financial deregulation, self-correcting markets, and
moral hazard as a basis for intervention in systemic panics. In the Friedman
birthday speech, Ben Bernanke lamented the series of Fed decisions from 1928
to 1932 to contract the money supply. Under this approach, the Fed raised
interest rates and failed to supply emergency lending to banks suffering
depositor runs. They thus missed the chance to restore confidence in the safety
of deposits in the system of the time, before deposit insurance.
Indeed, a central element of the Federal Reserve’s original mission had
been to provide just this type of assistance (lender of last resort lending to stem
depositor runs) to the banking system. The Fed’s failure to fulfill its mission
184
185

HOOVER, supra note 183, at 31.
Id. Bernanke, provides this account of the impact of the Depression on views of government:
The impact that the experience of the Depression has had on views about
the role of the government in the economy is easily understood when we
recall the sheer magnitude of that economic downturn. During the major
contraction phase of the Depression, between 1929 and 1933, real output
in the United States fell nearly 30 percent. During the same period,
according to retrospective studies, the unemployment rate rose from about
3 percent to nearly 25 percent, and many of those lucky enough to have a
job were able to work only part-time.

Id.
186

Andrew Mellon, Hoover’s Secretary of the Treasury, is widely quoted as the source of a
heartless version of liquidationist theory. White, supra note 183, at 758–59.
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was, again, largely the result of the economic theories held by the Federal
Reserve leadership. The infamous “liquidationist” thesis of Treasury Secretary
Andrew Mellon, who argued that weeding out “weak” banks was a harsh but
necessary prerequisite to the recovery of the banking system.187
3. The Harms of Narrow Academic and Professional Cultures
in Macroeconomics
The sad irony of the brilliance of Ben Bernanke is that, just like the
Depression-era Fed that became unwisely attached to the bad idea(s) known as
the “liquidationist” theory of monetary policy, Bernanke and the Fed of his era
became attached to their own set of bad ideas. In the 2008 financial crisis, the
bad ideas that Bernanke-Greenspan embraced were the laissez faire belief in selfcorrecting markets leading to radical financial deregulation. This approach then
cascaded to create a regulation-free zone consisting of an opaque shadow
banking system devoid of capital cushions. Such an environment created balance
sheet fusion with the formal banks, lack of regulatory oversight and finally blind
reliance on macroeconomic tools (interest rates up or down to get out of a
recession) just as the second greatest global financial and economic crisis came
to a head.
As I discuss more fully below, the interconnected nodes—created by
Fed bank regulatory action and inaction before the crisis—converged between
2004 and 2008 to create a financial disaster that was beyond the cognitive
perception of a collection of the best and the brightest macroeconomists leading
the Federal Reserve. The crisis exposed a cognitive narrowness that reflects
continuity from pre-crisis belief in self-correcting markets for home loans
(without government rules to prevent exploitation of vulnerable populations) to
the post-crisis effort to adhere, incompletely, to a diffuse concept of moral
hazard precepts for public policy choices in a global credit crisis. Both
liquidationist theory and laissez faire belief in self-correcting markets,
historically plagued with racial exploitation, were economic phrenology. They
were pseudo-scientific understandings of how the world works, even as it was
changing dramatically.
The 2008 financial crisis was the result of a profound economic miscalculation by the Federal Reserve. The transcripts188 of the Federal Reserve meetings
187

Ben S. Bernanke, Governor, Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., Money, Gold, and the
Great Depression. Remarks at the H. Parker Willis Lecture in Economic Policy, (May 2,
2004) [hereinafter Money, Gold, and the Great Depression].
188
TRANSCRIPTS OF FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE MEETINGS 2007-2009, available
at https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2007.htm, https://www.fe
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from the most intense period of the financial crisis, 2007-2009, provide, for the
first time, a comprehensive factual basis for evaluating the dynamics of these
highly confidential deliberations. This Article offers a novel framework of
“cognitive narrowness”189 to answer two crucial questions about the Fed’s
failure to see the residential mortgage train headed straight for the global
economy. First, why didn’t they see the crisis approaching? Second, why didn’t
they have contingency plans in place for the doomsday scenario that all major
federal agencies are required to have in their areas of responsibility?
What factors within the Board’s decision-making process obscured its
view of the potential for panic in the unregulated shadow banking system, and
caused its attention to be drawn instead to the wrong problem, inflation? This
misdirection meant that this global central bank was forced to resort to ad hoc
solutions. Fortunately, they mostly worked. But, we are still left with the
lingering question of why the Fed’s pre-crisis planning failed to generate a
previously agreed upon plan of action for the real crisis: a panic in the
unregulated shadow banking market, consisting of hedge funds, pension funds
and complex structured financial instruments to provide short term funding for
residential mortgage securitizations. The crisis that emerged in 2008 was
within the Fed’s responsibility as a financial regulator. However, bank
regulation was an orphan among the Fed’s many economic leadership roles.
This section combines four different, but related, features. These four
dynamics fit within my concept of “cognitive narrowness.” This framework
provides a useful way of starting to figure out the reason for the most profound
economic miscalculation since the Great Depression. The first of the four
features is the Board’s ideological commitment to free markets in financial
regulation; the second is the narrow band of professional training in macroeconomics within the Board of Governors constrained awareness of how the precrisis deregulation had unleashed unbridled risk that was hidden from view.
The third feature is that the composition of the board and rotating
membership in the Fed Open Markets Committee lacked a diverse set of
perceptual tools and experience.190 Regarding this particular features, decisional
deralreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm, and https://www.federalreserve.
gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2009.htm (last visited Oct. 16 2016) [hereinafter FOMC
TRANSCRIPTS]. Note that the charts, graphs, and other supporting documents were released
on Friday, February 21, 2014.
189
I have adopted the label “cognitive narrowness” to describe four separate, but related
phenomena that are observable in the Federal Reserve policy actions before and after the
Financial Crisis.
190
After confirmation, upon assuming formal leadership of the Fed, Chair Yellen addressed the
problem of insufficient diversity in the economics profession as a contributing factor in the
failure of the profession to see the financial crisis. Yellen has proven to be a visionary leader
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economist Scott Page was able to establish through models for difficult problems
that a diversity of perspectives, heuristics, and personal experience trumped
individual ability and homogeneity. The Page models showed that “a randomly
selected collection of individual problem solvers outperforms a collection of the
best individual problem solver.”191
Finally, fourth, the Fed displayed many of the characteristics of
Groupthink, first catalogued by Yale social psychologist, Irving Janis, in his
speaking to the economics profession about the conceptual problems afflicting the predictive
power of macroeconomics. Nicholas Lemann, The Hand on the Lever: How Janet Yellen is
Redefining the Federal Reserve, NEW YORKER (July 21, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2014/07/21/the-hand-on-the-lever.
Speaking to the American Economics Association, October 2014, Yellen observed:
There has been a fair amount of public debate in recent years about the health
of the economics profession, prompted in part by the failure of many
economists to comprehend the dire threats and foresee the damage of the
financial crisis. When the public asks whether economists did all they could
have to understand those threats, in part they are asking whether our
profession did enough over the years to test ideas and assumptions that turned
out in some cases to have been mistaken or misplaced. And part of that
question is this one: Did the economics profession recruit and promote the
individuals best able to bring the energy, the fresh insights, and the renewal
that every field and every body of knowledge needs to remain healthy?
Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., Welcoming Remarks at the
National Summit on Diversity in the Economics Profession, (Oct. 30, 2014), https://www.
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20141030a.htm.
For Yellen’s comments on network theory, see Janet L. Yellen, Vice Chair, Bd. of Governors,
Fed. Reserve Sys., Interconnectedness and Systemic Risk: Lessons from the Financial Crisis and
Policy Implications, Remarks at the American Economic Association/American Finance
Association Joint Luncheon (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
yellen20130104a.htm [hereinafter Interconnectedness and Systemic Risk].
For Yellen’s comments on unemployment, see Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Bd. of Governors, Fed.
Reserve Sys., Labor Market Dynamics and Monetary Policy, Remarks at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City Economic Symposium (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/yellen20140822a.htm.
For Yellen’s comments on subprime mortgages, see Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Bd. of Governors,
Fed. Reserve Sys., Housing Market Developments and Their Effects on Low-and ModerateIncome Neighborhoods, Remarks at the 2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Policy
Summit (June 9, 2011), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20110609a.htm.
191
SCOTT PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER
GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 162–74 (2008).
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classic study of failures in high level government decision-making groups.192
Janis study identifies the how the dynamic of closed-minded “groupthink” led
to several major “government fiascoes.” Irving explores how the flawed, narrow
cognitive style of small high level groups of government decision-makers led
to the major “fiascoes” of bad decision-making before Pearl Harbor: the Cuban
Missile Crisis, the Bay of Pigs invasion, and the separation of North and South
Korea. Finally, Janis concludes that the Watergate cover-up was a classic fiasco,
in which a small group of high level government decision-makers failed to seek
the advice of a broader group of thinkers before they plunged headlong into a
paranoid “fiasco” that led to President Nixon’s resignation, in the face of certain
impeachment.
These four attributes of cognitive narrowness combined to produce a
treacherous perceptual blindness. If you don’t see the individual components
of the crisis as problems, then it is hard to prepare for coherent solutions. The
growing subprime lending and reliance on financing from complex,
unregulated financial products were never seen as problems by the Greenspanled Fed. Chairman Bernanke shared these free market pre-commitments. Once
the crisis emerged however, Bernanke quickly abandoned his reluctance to use
government power to shape a rescue.
The discipline of macroeconomics itself narrowed the vision of Fed
leadership. Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner, the father of law and economics, blamed macroeconomics for the failure of the Fed to predict the crisis.193
Macroeconomics and financial economics are highly prestigious
fields of economics, and the leading macroeconomists and finance theorists are brilliant people. Yet although the housing
bubble started to leak air in 2005 and burst in 2006 and the
economy was in recession from the end of 2007 at the latest and
the drumbeat of signals warning of an impending crash became
deafening by the spring of 2008, not enough economists,
whether in academia, the government, or business, sounded the
alarm in time to have a significant impact on the government or
the banking industry. Securitization of mortgages and other debts
was taken at face value as protecting us against the kind of
housing-credit bubbles that had ravished East Asian countries in
the 1990s. In May 2006, Federal Reserve chairman Bernanke
192

See generally IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY
DECISIONS & FIASCOES (1972).
193
RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE DESCENT
INTO DEPRESSION 190 (2011) [hereinafter A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM].
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said that the housing market was “cooling,” but that this cooling
was “orderly and moderate” and that the market appeared to be
“headed for a safe landing.” His predecessor, Alan Greenspan,
who in July 2005 had expressed mild concern about housing
prices, said in October 2006 that the “worst may well be over.194
One preeminent macroeconomist was caught without an economic
compass when he refused to say that a recession was underway, yet a mere 30
days later stated that the evidence that the nation was in a recession was
conclusive.195 Posner offers this more general critique of macroeconomics:
Even now, the profession seems adrift in uncertainty and irresolution, as if it cannot believe what had happened. No consensus
has emerged with regard to how best to respond to the
depresssion. Most economists seem willing to try virtually
anything in an effort to dig the economy out of the hole into
which it’s fallen.196
Shared faith in macroeconomics is the necessary starting point for
evaluating the two interconnected roles of the Fed as banking regulator and its
role as guarantor of our national economic stability and freedom from the
damaging shocks of banking panics. As financial regulator, the Fed is the lead
government conceptualist with responsibility for articulating coherent rationale
for government regulation of our system of private financial institutions. It is,
of course, also responsible for implementing a system of rules, at once practical
and logical. These must be rules that succeed in monitoring and controlling
the risk-taking propensities of private financial institutions. Theory and reality
must align.
My review of the Fed Transcripts, minutes, and other materials from
the FOMC crisis deliberations supports my agreement with U.C. Berkeley
sociologists Neil Fligstein, Jonah Stuart Brundage and Michael Schultz
(hereinafter Fligstein et al.) who argue that:
[The Federal Open Market Committee] failed to see the depth
of the problem because of its overreliance on macroeconomics
as a framework for making sense of the economy. As a result
of this framework, Committee members failed to see the deeper
194

Id. at 253.
Id. at 255.
196
Id.
195
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connections between the housing market and the financial
sector via the securitization of mortgages and the use of
financial instruments. Thus, they significantly underestimated
the degree to which the economy was in danger of collapse.197
Fligstein and his colleagues consider the role of macroeconomic
commitments as the major source of the limited vision revealed in the 2007-9
transcripts. Fligstein, a sociologist, studies the sociology of markets, with
special focus on financial markets.198 Fligstein, et al. ask why the Fed was so
sanguine about the prospects of a limited impact of the contraction in the
housing market, despite substantial concerns about the problems developing in
financial markets.
Primarily, they rely on the theory of “sensemaking” in sociology. Using
“topic models”199 to map the recurring word patterns in the transcripts of the
pre-crisis deliberations of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC),
Fligstein’s review of meeting transcripts revealed that:
[The FOMC] had surprisingly little recognition that there was a
serious financial crisis brewing as late as December 2007. This
lack of awareness was a function of the inability of the FOMC
to connect the unfolding events into a narrative reflecting the
links between the housing market, the subprime mortgage
market, and the financial instruments being used to package the
mortgages into securities. We use the idea of sensemaking to
explain how this happened. The Fed’s main analytic framework
for making sense of the economy, macroeconomic theory, made
it difficult for them to connect the disparate events that comprised the financial crisis into a coherent whole.
We use topic modeling to analyze transcripts of FOMC meetings held
between 2000 and 2007, demonstrating that the framework provided by
macroeconomics dominated FOMC conversations throughout this period. The
topic models also show that each of the issues involved in the crisis remained
197

Neil Fligstein et al., Why the Federal Reserve Failed to See the Financial Crisis of 2008:
The Role of ‘Macroeconomics’ as a Sensemaking and Cultural Frame 3-4 (Inst. for Research
on Labor & Employment, Working Paper No. 111-14, 2014).
198
Biography of Neil Fligstein, UC BERKELEY SOC. DEP’T, http://sociology.berk
eley.edu/faculty/neil-fligstein.
199
Fligstein and his colleagues define topic models as “a class of statistical methods that
attempt to describe underlying semantic regularities in a set of documents by mapping
recurring relationships between words.” Fligstein et al., supra note 197, at 14.
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a separate discussion and were never connected together. This Article adds to
the persuasive Fligstein “sensemaking” explanation by going beyond the
limitations of the Fed deliberations identified in the sensemaking critique. I
introduce an interdependent network explanation for why the dynamics of the
separate elements of the crisis interacted with each other to produce the sudden
catastrophic failure of the entire global financial system. My discussion of
network theory in this Article draws most heavily from the physical network
theories and metaphors of scientists and bankers.200 I have also benefited
greatly from the work of law professor David Grewal who maps another sphere
of network theory in globalization. Grewal’s work combines social theory,
political theory, philosophy, ethics and human freedom to craft an argument
about the dynamic of the globalization of power.201 The future application of
network theory in constructing models of systemic financial risk will require a
creative interdisciplinary perspective that incorporates both the human dimension of Grewal and the physical science perspective of Gai.
This combination should yield valuable analyses of how interdependent
global financial networks behave in order to improve financial regulatory prediction. My discussion of networks below is a hybrid of social interaction in
financial networks (racial discrimination) and the physical balance sheet fusion
of regulated systems of formal banks and unregulated shadow banks (shadow
bank node). An understanding of both the social and physical properties of
networks is required to avoid repeating the Fed’s profound economic failures to
predict the global cascade of financial failure during the crisis.
B. The Fed’s Blindness to the Emerging Literature of Interdependent
Financial Networks
1. Network Theory for Bankers202
Banks and other financial intermediaries have a long tradition of
sharing risk and excess capital through direct interbank lending and loan
syndications. The traditional forms of connection and sharing of assets and
200

U.S. National Academies/National Research Council and the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York collaborated to “stimulate fresh thinking on systemic risk” they invited a variety
researches from different disciplines to explore the conceptual congruence between systemic
risk in the financial sector and engineering, ecology, epidemiology, of science. John
Kahmbhu, Scott Weidman & Neel Krishnan, Preface to New Directions for Understanding
Systemic Risk, 13 ECON. POL’Y REV. i, i (2006).
201
See generally DAVID GREWAL, NETWORK POWER AND THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF
GLOBALIZATION (2008).
202
See generally Robert M. May, Simon A. Levin & George Sugihara, Ecology for Bankers,
451 NATURE 893 (2008).
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liabilities across broad categories of financial intermediaries were largely
benign. However, the financial crisis revealed new, more sinister implications
of a relatively recent phenomenon: the global interconnections between
regulated, fully capitalized formal commercial banks and the largely
unregulated shadow banks without capital cushions to protect against adverse
events, panics, and runs.
Five years after the crisis, Fed Chair Janet Yellen gave an important
presentation to the American Economics Association assessing the systemic
risk concerns that arose during the crisis. Yellen noted that these concerns,
along with much recent academic research, suggest:
That interconnection among financial intermediaries is not an
unalloyed good. Complex interactions among market actors
may serve to amplify existing market frictions, information
asymmetries, or other externalities. The difficult task before
market participants, policymakers, and regulators with systemic
risk responsibilities such as the Federal Reserve is to find ways
to preserve the benefits of interconnectedness in financial
markets while managing the potentially harmful side effects.203
In the wake of the Great Recession there has been increasing attention
within the scholarly literature to the search for explanatory models addressing the relationship between systemic risk and interconnectedness.204 In her
talk, Yellen described five models that illustrate the complexity and density
of linkages between institutions.205 While recognizing the advantages of
203

Once she became Chair, Yellen demonstrated the intellectual curiosity and leadership
one might expect from an academic economist. Her speeches to the American Economic
Association after her confirmation set a new research agenda for the entire macroeconomics
profession. Interconnectedness and Systemic Risk, supra note 190.
204
Yellen mentions more than 600 publications since 2007. Id. at 5.
205
Five models are discussed by Yellen: 1) Allen and Gale model that sustains that systemic
risk arises through liquidity shocks and has a domino effect in the system. Systems that have
diversified funding (complete networks) are more resilient to shocks than system where
funding is not diversified (incomplete networks); 2) Douglas Diamond and Phillip Dybvig
model, that shows how stress or uncertainty can cause coordination failures in check-clearing
systems where credit extensions among banks results in institutions “too interconnected to
fail”; 3) Hyun Song Shin model that explains the complexity of the links between financial
institutions where interbank claims, that grow and contract far more quickly than economic
fundamentals, affect the leverage of the institutions involved. During a boom institutions tend
to increase leverage by borrowing and lending more intensively to each other causing the
“intertwining claims to extend further and further”; during shocks institutions look for
deleverage in the short term by withdrawing credit form each other consequently affecting the
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interconnectedness in the financial system, such as risk sharing and diversification, she also warned of the potential systemic risks these connections
pose.206
As I have said, I believe that the study of networks as developed several
areas of science offers a template for research into financial networks. In their
article “Ecology for Bankers,” Robert May,207 Simon Levin, and George
Sugihara explore the similarities between ecosystems and financial systems.
Both are complex, dynamic, interlinked systems whose stability is threatened
by conditions that are not always easy to identify except from the perspective
of the system as a whole—the perspective, I argue, that must be adopted by
regulators like the Fed.
2. The Shadow Bank Node
“[T]he nation’s financial system had become vulnerable and interconnected in
ways that were not understood by either the captains of finance or the system’s
public stewards.”208
- Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
Sheila Bair, Chair of the FDIC during the crisis, noted the potentially
cataclysmic consequences of the emerging shadow bank connections to the
large regular banks.209 Bair declared the danger lurking in the shadow banking
liability side of other institution’s balance sheet and ultimately forcing them to liquidate assets
at fire prices; 4) Ricardo Caballero and Alp Simsek model illustrates that a lack of information
of the participant’s counterparties can create systemic risk in financial networks. The
“maximum principle” is that “each seeks to maximize profits under the assumption that the
network is configured in the worst possible manner form its own perspective,” therefore an
adverse liquidity shock would lead to withdrawn funding from their counterparties, magnifying
the effects of the initial shock; 5) Gai, Haldane and Kapadia model focus on the range of
activities and different size and position of the market participants—some banks are larger than
others, more interconnected than others and some of them are weaker than others. Failure in
this concentrated network will cause a more serious contagion, thus, understanding these
relationships helps prevent systemic risk. Id. at 5–10.
206
“Diversification reduces risk and improves stability. While the idea is compelling, both
economic research and the events of the financial crisis suggest that it is incomplete.” Id. at 6.
207
May, supra note 202.
208
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 9, at 6. One financial industry witness
before the FCIC said: “All this financial creativity was like ‘cheap sangria’, a lot of cheap
ingredients packaged to sell at a premium, it might taste good for a while, but then you get
headaches later.” Transcript of First Public Hearing of the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Commission, Day
1, Panel 2, Financial Market Participants 14 (Jan. 13, 2010) (statement of Michael Mayo).
209
See generally SHEILA BAIR, BULL BY THE HORNS: FIGHTING TO SAVE MAIN STREET FROM
WALL STREET AND WALL STREET FROM ITSELF (2012).
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node. Bair gives this harrowing account of the unregulated shadow banks that
held pools of home mortgages in structured investment vehicle (SIVs) that
were established as trusts. They were hidden from the FDIC right up to the
moment when the shadow banking node began to fail in August 2007. The
August 2007 failure followed the model of other interdependent network
failures.210 Soon there was a cascade of failures running through other nodes,
unseen by the Federal Reserve, that ended with the Lehman failure in
September 2008. Bair provides this detailed account from inside the front lines
of the global financial crisis:
My first clue was the structured investment vehicle (SIV)
fiasco, which occurred in August 2007. That was when the
canary in the coalmine started gasping for breath. A number of
large financial institutions, led by Citigroup, started having
trouble accessing enough funding to support their mortgages
and MBS investments. Citi and a few other large banks had set
up something called “structured investment vehicles” as a way
to invest in mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. For
reasons that still today [2013] remain a mystery to me, they
were allowed by their regulators—the Fed and the OCC—to
keep the investments off balance sheet, meaning that they were
not included in the financial reports insured banks filed with us,
and most important, they were not required to hold capital or
reserves against those assets to absorb losses. Indeed, our
examiners did not know anything about SIVs until the Federal
Reserve Board alerted us to Citi’s difficulties.211
One of the most notable transformations in the financial system in the
last twenty years was the growth of shadow banking.212 Before the Great Recession, the shadow banking system was believed to be no more than a competitor
of traditional commercial banking. For example, in the 1970s investment banks
like Merrill Lynch, Fidelity and Vanguard lured deposit customers away from
210

See UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS, supra note 72, for the most
powerful explanation of the dynamic of cascading failure caused by interconnected bank
balance sheets. In addition, I identify the characteristics of the five leading models identified
by Chairwoman Yellen’s important speech analyzing the characteristics of financial system
interdependent network failure. Interconnectedness and Systemic Risk, supra note 190.
211
BAIR, supra note 209, at 73.
212
Izabella Kaminski, The Terminal Disease Afflicting Banking, FINANCIAL TIMES
ALPHAVILLE BLOG (July 18, 2012), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2012/07/18/1085541/the-term
inal-disease-afflicting-banking/. See supra note 16 for more information on “shadow banking.”
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traditional banks by offering high interest rates on transaction accounts that
functioned exactly like checking accounts, with one important exception: the
new “cash management accounts” were not covered by deposit insurance.213
At the time, the Fed believed that in the event of problems, the wellrun, well-capitalized, and well-regulated large commercial banks could provide vital support for the entire economy, thus rendering the shadow sector
unimportant as a source of risk to the overall economy.214 This minimizing
approach to the shadow sector (consisting of commercial paper, asset-backed
commercial paper, repo, and money market mutual funds) became untenable
as the value of the shadow banking sector surpassed the value of the formal
banking sector by 2006.215 In addition to the growing value of the shadow
sector, the pervasive links between the two systems would later render the
traditional banking system so deeply obligated for off-balance-sheet activities
transferred to the shadow sector that the formal sector would become impotent
to provide adequate liquidity without extraordinary emergency support from
the Fed. Thus, the cascading effects of the runs on Bear Stearns and Lehman
Brothers precipitated a general panic and eventually the crash.
The Federal Reserve was startled to discover during the financial crisis
that the formal banking system and the shadow banking system had become
inseparable. Selected failures within the shadow system had sparked a panic
because of the system’s lack of transparency, and this opacity in turn triggered
a rolling sequence of panic in both other shadow participants and the deeply
interconnected conventional commercial banks, which were then called on to
back up their shadow partners. Unfortunately, the commercial banking sector
lacked sufficient total liquidity to stabilize both systems. This illiquidity, in
turn, threatened the failure of the entire global financial system.216
Macroeconomist Gary Gorton describes this new form of panic in the
shadow banking sector as follows:
Economists view the world as being the outcome of the
“invisible hand,” that is, a world where private decisions are
unknowingly guided by prices to allocate resources efficiently.
The credit crisis raises the question of how it is that we could
get slapped in the face by the invisible hand. What happened?
Many private decisions were made, over a long time, which
213
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created the shadow banking system. That system was vulnerable
to a banking panic. The U.S. had a banking panic starting in
August 2007, one that continues today. But banking panics, you
say, like the one in the movie “It’s a Wonderful Life,” don’t
happen anymore.
Indeed, until these recent events, most people did not think of
banking panics as something to be concerned about. After all,
the panics of the Great Depression are a dim memory. Since
1934 when deposit insurance was adopted, until the current
panic–a span of almost 75 years–there had been no banking
panics.217
A review of regulatory decisions since as early as 1995 and more
intensively during the early 2000s makes it clear that US regulators were blind
to the elephant in the room—the deep and complex interconnections that had
emerged between the shadow banks and the commercial banking system. As
late as September 2008, after the failure of Lehman Brothers, the Fed did not
recognize that the interdependent networks of racialized subprime lending,
securitization, structured products, off-balance-sheet accounting, and the
embedded risks of unregulated short-term funding markets were inseparably
linked to the heavily regulated commercial banking system and the investment
banks. The deadly synergy of free-market ideology and GroupThink homogeneity made the Fed Board of Governors ideally suited to overlook the factors
triggering a deadly cascade of failures that overwhelmed the Board and
required it to do “whatever it takes” to avoid a global financial calamity.
3. The Race Node
The post-crisis literature has failed to engage racial discrimination as a
source of systemic risk.218 Fed Governor Sarah Bloom Raskin’s remarkable
leadership has begun a conversation about the role of racially discriminatory
lending in the financial crisis.219 This Article is intended to extend that important
217
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conversation. It is crucial to elevate the consideration of the persistent problem
of racial discrimination in economically important markets such as housing. The
Federal Reserve is the most robust econometric organization in the world, yet,
as noted earlier, there is not a single reference to race or racial discrimination to
be found in 1,800 pages of Board transcripts and speeches from 2007 to 2008.220
In my view, this cognitive omission of racial discrimination from the
framework of factors that matter in setting capital levels, leverage ratios, and
enforcement policies for both the formal and shadow systems will be a
continuing vulnerability of the global banking system as long as the interconnectedness among a large variety of regulated and unregulated entities
remains unrecognized. Race and economic inequality factors belong on any
map of interdependent financial networks.
As I discuss more fully below, the network theory approach to systemic
risk is promising because it proceeds on the assumption that as in electrical and
other physically interdependent systems, a failure in a small node of an interdependent financial network can trigger a cascade of failure in the entire system.
This Article does not attempt to provide an economic data-driven
model of race and inequality as integrated components of systemic risk. My
task here is to provide one approach to answering the difficult question of why
the Fed failed to perceive the interlinkage among network nodes of systemic
risk. Through the lens of interdependent financial network theory, I show that
one of these nodes, racial discrimination in home mortgage origination,
contributed to the cascade of failures leading to the crisis.
The Fed can’t solve problems to which it is blind. My aim is to
encourage the Fed to do what it does best, create quantitative measurements of
economic inequality and racial discrimination to make visible what it did not
see as a source of systemic risk during the mortgage debt bubble. If the way
to the Fed’s heart and mind is through quantitative language, then normative
inequality scholarship such as mine must provide a bridge from the status quo
to a new understanding that transcends the macroeconomic, data-driven culture
of the Fed.
the State of the U.S. and World Economies, (Apr. 18, 2013) (stating that minorities are one
of the groups that bear the brunt of a downturn because they are more likely to experience
flat or declining wages, reduced hours, and unemployment during a recession); see also
GEORGE J. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY
DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2009) (providing
an examination of why poverty rates are consistently higher among minorities); Sarah Bloom
Raskin, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Aspects of Inequality in the Recent
Business Cycle (Apr. 18, 2013).
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In order to “put the pieces of the puzzle together” and “imagine”221 the
coming collapse, the Fed would have had to observe and interpret signals from
many disparate but interdependent networks, signals that taken together posed
massive systemic risk. In what follows I discuss a problem that particularly
highlights the interdependent network risks that surprised the Fed and are
central to the story of the failures of 2008: racially discriminatory subprime
loans.
C. Deregulation: Faith in the Power of Self-Correcting Markets
The lack of disciplinary consensus within macroeconomics allowed
ideology and political commitments to dominate economic arguments. Posner
leveled this charge as well. “The divisions within the economics profession
over fundamental issues of policy gave political preferences free rein to shape
economic policy.”222
Where was the Fed in all this?223 “In 2005, Alan Greenspan, then
chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, praised subprime mortgages as a
positive innovation made possible by better risk assessment. . . . Only two
years later, there was growing concern that failing subprime loans, which had
shot up to nearly a quarter of the total mortgage market originations, were
driving our economy into recession.”224 Beyond macroeconomics, the hybrid
ideology of law and economics allows us to consider the impact of relaxed
legal rules. First, consider the non-enforcement of prohibitions against unfair
lending practices in home mortgage origination.
For example, Bob Gnaizda, the general counsel and policy director of
the Greenlining Institute, a California-based nonprofit housing group, told the
Commission that he began meeting with Greenspan at least once a year starting
in 1999, each time highlighting to him the growth of predatory lending practices
and discussing with him the social and economic problems they were creating.225
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) concluded that the
entire financial crisis could have been avoided with more vigilant regulatory
oversight. The FCIC singles out the Fed for this especially withering criticism.
221

Bernanke, supra note 171, at 82.
A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, supra note 193, at 273.
223
Binyamin Appelbaum, Fed Held Back as Evidence Mounted on Subprime Loan Abuses,
WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
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Little meaningful action was taken to quell the threats in a
timely manner. The prime example is the Federal Reserve’s
pivotal failure to stem the flow of toxic mortgages. The Federal
Reserve was the one entity empowered to so and it did not.226
Fidelity to the tenets of law and economics was perhaps the singledeadliest feature of myopia during the crisis. The reinforcing legal component
of law and economics with its strong preference for private markets over legal
rules led to the Board’s first big failures: failure to intervene as the market
proliferated racially exploitative loans227 and failure to prevent the subsequent
cascade of failures.
Macroeconomics has virtually nothing to say about racial discrimination.228 It was the overriding belief in self-correcting markets that led
Greenspan229 and other board members to simply dismiss “as anecdotal”230 the
mounting evidence of pervasive racial discrimination in unregulated
originations flooding minority communities. The legal arguments of Richard
Posner, derived from Coase, had prevailed in government policy circles in the
1970s through the economic collapse in 2008.
Posner, of course, is the father of law and economics. His seminal
casebook, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, bridged the disciplinary divide
between economics and law. Posner tells us that the conception of economics
he adopted for this casebook was that “economics is the science of rational
choice.”231 In 1992, Posner accepted this challenge for testing the value of his
contributions to what he called “positive” economic theory: An important test
of a theory is its ability to explain reality. If it does a lousy job, the reason may
be that its assumptions are insufficiently realistic.232
226

Id. at xvii
Id. at xviii.
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But see GEORGE J. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN
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But, curiously, the transcripts when combined with the authoritative
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission autopsy reveal that Bernanke had an
incomplete commitment to government rescues of failing financial firms. As,
I discuss below, these transcripts provide for the first time persuasive evidence
of the basis for the still incoherent distinction between the rescue of Bear
Stearns-Lehman Brothers- AIG flip flops on the moral hazard of government
bailouts. The transcripts show that the Fed wanted to send a signal that it would
let some, but not all, firms fail. The internal discussion of Lehman Brothers in
the summer and early fall of 2008 supports my “mixed signals,” “incomplete
commitment” to free markets interpretation.
Paul Krugman, the progressive Nobel Laureate, and Richard Posner,
the conservative founder of the law and economics movement—two public
intellectuals who rarely agree on anything—separately criticize the Fed’s
failure to predict this once in three generations financial crisis. Krugman’s
diagnosis was delivered early and often, from his column in the New York
Times. One early example, occurred in August 2007, one month before the fullblown crisis erupted. Krugman’s assessment of the Fed was blunt. He wrote
about KKR Financial, an investment firm that was not regulated by the Fed or
covered by deposit insurance, but provided funding for mortgage loans like
depositors in the old-fashioned depository bank. When KKR announced that it
couldn’t meet $5 billion of its obligations. Krugman concluded that:
[I]n economic terms what’s been happening amounts to a
burgeoning banking panic. . . . On Friday, the Federal Reserve
tried to quell this panic by announcing a surprise cut in the
discount rate, the rate at which it lends money to banks. Fed’s
move is largely symbolic. It makes more funds available to
depository institutions, a.k.a. old-fashioned banks—but oldfashioned banks aren’t where the crisis is centered. And the Fed
doesn’t have any clear way to deal with bank runs on institutions
that aren’t called banks.233
Posner’s evaluation, in particular, was quite harsh234:
Macroeconomics and financial economics are highly prestigious fields of economics, and the leading macroeconomists
and finance theorists are brilliant people. Yet although the
housing bubble started to leak air in 2005 and burst in 2006 and
233

Paul Krugman, It’s a Miserable Life, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2007, at A19,
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the economy was in recession from the end of 2007 at the latest
and the drumbeat of signals warning of an impending crash
became deafening by the spring of 2008, not enough
economists, whether in academia, the government, or business,
sounded the alarm in time to have a significant impact on the
government or the banking industry. Securitization of mortgages and other debts was taken at face value as protecting us
against the kind of housing-credit bubbles that had ravished
East Asian countries in the 1990s. In May 2006, Federal
Reserve chairman Bernanke said that the housing market was
“cooling,” but that this cooling was “orderly and moderate” and
that the market appeared to be “headed for a safe landing.” His
predecessor, Alan Greenspan, who in July 2005 had expressed
mild concern about housing prices, said in October 2006 that
the “worst may well be over.” . . . But [these] statements by
Greenspan and Bernanke . . . were misleading; they made
things worse.235
Across ideological lines, a stable consensus has formed. The financial
crisis was the result of a profound economic miscalculation. The Federal
Reserve did not anticipate the financial crisis until it was too late.
Posner similarly penetrating critique of the Fed is perhaps even more
problematic than Krugman’s because his work in the early 1970s adopting
economics Nobel Laureate Gary Becker’s view of the market dynamics of
racial discrimination provided the foundation for the deregulatory approach to
racial discrimination in markets, an approach that certainly influenced Fed
Chair Alan Greenspan’s thinking about whether to enforce the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) of 1994.
This section of the paper introduces a framework that tries to make
sense of the Fed’s otherwise inexplicable miscalculation. I address two
questions. First, why didn’t the Fed see the crisis coming, and second, when
the crisis was just days away? Why did the Fed resort to ad hoc solutions
without a well-developed plan of action?
The second question can be answered more easily than the first. In an
emergency, the adrenaline flows and chaotic human reactions take over. In his
last speech before he ended his term as Fed chair, Ben Bernanke expressed his
own disorientation when the crisis erupted in September 2008. “If you’re in a
car wreck or something, you’re mostly involved in trying to avoid going off the
235
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bridge. And then, later on, you say, ‘Oh my God!’”236 Bernanke’s car wreck
metaphor certainly does capture the frenzied reaction to the crisis and the inconsistent initial response, but it doesn’t offer any insight as to why there was a crash.
Cognitive narrowness provides a useful way of answering both questions. I identify four, sometimes overlapping characteristics of cognitive
narrowness: (1) an ideological commitment to free markets; (2) the narrow band
of macroeconomic professional training and expertise within the Fed’s Board of
Governors; (3) the problem of cognitive homogeneity as modeled by decisional
economist Scott Page, who shows that a lack of diverse perspectives, diverse
heuristics, and diverse cognitive tools combines to produce an unwitting
perceptual blindness; and (4) the “Groupthink” syndrome, first identified by
Yale social psychologist Irving Janis, who catalogued patterns of self-censorship
and narrow consultation with outside experts in high-level government policy
groups, patterns yielding a consensus that results in “fiascoes.”
If cognitive narrowness prevents you from seeing the components of a
crisis as problems, then it is hard to envision solutions. The growth of subprime
lending and the reliance on unregulated financial instruments were never seen
as problems by the Greenspan-led Fed. Chairman Bernanke shared his
predecessor’s free-market commitments, but once the crisis emerged, he
quickly abandoned his reluctance to use government power to shape a rescue.
Curiously, the transcripts of closed meetings of the Federal Reserve
Open Market Committee (FOMC) during the most intense phase of the global
financial crisis in 2007 and 2008, along with the authoritative FCIC autopsy,
reveal that Bernanke’s commitment to government rescue of failing financial
firms was incomplete. As I discuss below, the new transcripts provide one
persuasive explanation for the still incoherent decision to rescue Bear Stearns
but not Lehman Brothers, just five months later, followed by the massive
bailout for AIG. The Fed wanted to send a signal that it would let some but not
all firms fail. The Fed was still in thrall to law and economics and the moral
hazard critique of market-based incentives to curtail excessive risk-taking. The
FOMC discussion of Lehman Brothers’ problems during the summer of 2008
after the Bear Stearns rescue supports this interpretation.
The FOMC transcripts contain no complete surprises, but they breathe
life into the consequences of human failures of cognition and perception, and
they provide confirmation of my argument that three crucial factors led to the
Federal Reserve’s failure to anticipate the sudden near-collapse of the global
financial system.
236
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First, adherence to incomplete or erroneous macroeconomic and
ideological frameworks about how financial markets work led the Fed to
focus on inflation, just as the risks of incoherent financial deregulation
reached their peak. One source of this narrowness was the homogeneous
disciplinary training of board members in macroeconomic theory.
Second, the Fed was unaware of the networked danger of rapidly
accumulating risks and the corresponding growth of the completely
unregulated financial networks created by its decision not to rein in racially
targeted subprime lending. By 2000 these networks exceeded the size of the
formal banking system; by 2007 the formal banking system had a value of
$10.5 trillion, and the shadow sector had a value of $13 trillion.237 There is
persuasive evidence that the Fed did not see how its program of aggressive
deregulation created opaque transactions about which even it lacked
information concerning the identity of counterparties or the size and composition of various short-term financing entities.
Without this basic balance sheet information, the Fed lacked
indispensable tools to assess the quantity and quality of these unseen risks.
Moreover, without capital requirements, this burgeoning no-regulation zone
grew without a safety net. The Fed’s aggressive deregulatory approach before
the crisis severely compromised its ability to monitor and control the
escalating risk in the shadow market. It could not regulate or plan for the
impact of an exploding bubble whose growth it had blindly stimulated
through deregulation. The Fed is the only monetary, economic, and financial
regulator in the world with the independent power to backstop the global
financial system by creating $12.8 trillion based solely on a vote of 14
members of the FOMC, headed by the chairman of the Federal Reserve. The
paradox of the Fed’s unique power is that despite its unrivalled global
economic and monetary status, and because of its cognitive narrowness, it
simply could not connect its decade of deregulation to the emergence of the
shadow banking system and its contribution to the growing problem of
economic inequality.
For a long time, the American-led transformation of the global
financial system and the emergence of a deeply interconnected network of
interdependent financial nodes sparked pride in a stable, prosperous US
financial system. A story of American economic and financial exceptionalism
prevailed, until just days after it all fell down in September 2008.
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III. WHAT CAN THE FED DO ABOUT INEQUALITY?
A. Overview
The answer to the question that drives this section, “What can the Fed
Do About Inequality?” depends, in part, on your economic and political
commitments.238 First, the Fed must learn from its overreliance on the narrow
cognitive framework of conventional macroeconomics. It must assess the
opportunity to mitigate and install organizational structures to create counter
dynamics to lessen the effects of groupthink.239
For some, the Federal Reserve is a non-elected political entity.240
Another view is that the Fed is a largely non-political, technical manager of the
routine monetary policy decisions that affect the health of our economy.241
238

Arindrajit Dube & Ethan Kaplan, Occupy Wall Street and the Political Economy of
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BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO
SEPARATE FEDERAL RESERVE MONETARY POLICY DECISIONS FROM POLITICAL INFLUENCE?,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/why-is-it-important-to-separate-federal-reserve-monetarypolicy-decisions-from-political-influence.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2016).

Vol. 2:1]

The Hidden Structures of Inequality

177

Those who believe that Fed monetary, bank regulatory and macroeconomic responsibilities are beyond politics, also subscribe to the view that
the Fed has no role to play in causing or ameliorating the profoundly intertwined American problems of race and economic inequality.242
The Federal Reserve today is the product of long-running political
argument that can be traced to the founding of the nation.243 The founding
fathers were deeply divided about the place for a central monetary authority.244
Hamilton favored a strong central government institution to manage the national
debt, control economic activity and establish the international creditworthiness
of the new nation.245 Jefferson and Madison adamantly opposed a strong central
bank, on the model of the privately owned Bank of England. They feared the
centralized control of the credit available to local farmers and businesses.
These two opposing original strands of the political economy of American
banking persist today. 1. Central government control of the levers of economic
power by northern financiers and foreign investors vs 2. Decentralized financial
institutions that fed American growth in the agrarian, slave-holding South.
Fear and suspicion of an all-powerful central bank that could favor one
region or political faction over another curtailed the short charters of the First
Bank of the United States (1791-1811); and fueled President Jackson’s populist
campaign and ultimate veto of renewing the Second Bank charter (1816-1836).
These political divisions gave rise to a seventy-seven-year period when there
was no central bank, until 1913 when the Federal Reserve was established.246
The Fed was created as a part of a progressive agenda,247 including a
reaction to the Panic of 1907 and the dominance of Wall St. banking baron, J.
P. Morgan’s handling of the panic with a syndicate of financiers who pooled
capital to serve as private “lenders of last resort.” Progressives were outraged
by the corruption and many conflicts of interest when a cabal of private bankers
decided which trusts, and the stocks they held, would be bailed out.248 The
242
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Progressive reformers succeeded in passing the progressive income tax of
1913, and the Federal Reserve act that same year. However, “the agrarian
reformers were defeated, their popular movement crushed. Their political
energy was first co-opted by the Democrats and then vanquished by the
Republicans. The central bank that Congress eventually created in 1913 was
not at all what the Populists had in mind.”249
The Fed emerged fitfully, over 95 years from a weak decentralized
quasi-government entity with power in the 12 regional banks, as a political
concession to the longstanding concern about the potential dominance of
northeastern financiers. The dismal performance of the passive Fed that raised
interest rates during the Great Depression is now legendary.250
With this political history in mind, in what follows, I portray the Fed as
a political entity bearing the distinguished DNA of our national political
economy of banking. I argue here that the Fed seeks to mask its political power
in complex mathematical models of the economy devoid of connection to, or
responsibility for any of the messy problems of American economic life such as
racism, the role of bank regulation and monetary policy in distributing the wealth
of the nation.251
With this political history in mind, in what follows, I portray the Fed as
a political entity bearing the distinguished DNA of our national political
economy of banking. I argue here that the Fed seeks to mask its political power
in complex mathematical models of the economy, devoid of connection to, or
responsibility for any of the messy problems of American economic life such as
racism, the role of bank regulation and monetary policy in distributing the wealth
of the nation.
B. The Fed Must Be Mandated to Develop Thick Macroeconomic and
Financial Systemic Risk Models for the Growing Wealth Inequality
The Federal Reserve conducts a triennial survey of the distribution of
wealth. In 2014, Chairman Janet L. Yellen highlighted the importance of this
survey of consumer finances in examining the increasing concentration of wealth
detailed, gripping account of the life of Wall St. titan, J.P Morgan, based on exclusive access
to previously private collection of Morgan’s personal papers. The chapter on the Panic of
1907 provides a definitive account of the conflicts of interest in Morgan’s handling of the
panic and the political accommodation he received from President Theodore Roosevelt,
despite Roosevelt’s otherwise firm commitments to Progressivism. Id. at 128.
249
See GREIDER, supra note 243, at 254, for a history on the origins of the Federal Reserve.
250
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Depression.
251
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at the very top of our economic distribution. Yellen sounded a clarion call to consider the deep social, economic and political impact of this unequal distribution:
It is no secret that the past few decades of widening inequality
can be summed up as significant income and wealth gains for
those at the very top and stagnant living standards for the
majority. I think it is appropriate to ask whether this trend is
compatible with values rooted in our nation's history, among
them the high value Americans have traditionally placed on
equality of opportunity.252
There is recent evidence that Fed Board economists are beginning to
use this data to learn about the essential components of the racial and wealth
disparities that drive vulnerability to market predation.253 However, this
preliminary descriptive investigation of racial wealth variables is a necessary,
but not sufficient condition, to build more sophisticated models of both macroeconomic and systemic risk arising from the conditions of racial discrimination
in housing finance markets and the historic wealth disparity between blacks
and whites.
Can the Fed be expected to build more sophisticated macroeconomic
or financial systemic risk models to incorporate the role of racial wealth
differences in assessing the vulnerabilities to the financial system? The answer
is no, at least not immediately, according to leading academic researchers, the
thin models of macroeconomic mapping of the dynamics of inequality is still
at a very rudimentary stage.254
252
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Mian and Sufi, tell us that:
The distribution of income/wealth matters a great deal for
thinking about the macro-economy. Convincing some of this fact
is not easy—many continue to work within a modeling
framework in which all distributional considerations are assumed
away, the so-called “representative-agent” framework.255
Therefore, although one might welcome a revolutionary insight from
policymakers on the Board, the limitations of the field of macroeconomics will
prove to be a drag on future possibilities for the necessary policy change that I
call for here.
C. The Fed Must Identify and Incorporate Social and Political
Financial Patterns of Exploitation in Models of Systemic Risk
My discussion of the history of racial discrimination in housing above
supports this proposal. In addition, Nobel laureates Akerlof and Shiller argue
persuasively that the nature of free markets makes predation and manipulation
inevitable features of most markets256 Akerlof and Shiller provide further
support from the field of economics for my argument that the Fed should
include these longstanding patterns of market manipulation, including racial
discrimination in systemic risk models of how our economy works.
D. The Fed Must Understand and Incorporate the Regulatory
Implications of Piketty’s Insight
According to Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman’s review of CAPITAL
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, Piketty has sparked a revolution in our
understanding of long-term trends in inequality, concluding that Piketty’s
work is:
IN THE

A tour de force of economic modeling, an approach that integrates the analysis of economic growth with that of the distribution
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of income and wealth. This is a book that will change both the
way we think about society and the way we do economics.257
Piketty’s intervention in economic analysis of inequality is not without
critics. Krugman highlights the objections of influential University of Chicago
macroeconomist Robert Lucas:
Some economists (not to mention politicians) tried to shout down
any mention of inequality at all: “Of the tendencies that are harmful to sound economics, the most seductive, and in my opinion the
most poisonous, is to focus on questions of distribution.” 258
If Krugman, but not Lucas, is right about the importance of Piketty’s
economic models of inequality, we must ask the Fed to engage this insight
directly and fashion an intellectually defensible response.
Yale law professor David Grewal understands the connection between
law, financial regulation and Piketty’s insight. In his review of Piketty’s
scholarship, Grewal sees the legal regulatory implication of Piketty’s insight.
For Grewal, Piketty’s insight creates an opportunity to develop an agenda
exploring the legal rules that structure and enforce capitalism.259
E. The Fed Must Have an Integrated Monitor of Household Debt Levels and
Consider Systemic Risk Implications of Imprudent Levels of Such Debt
As income and wealth inequality rise, the gap for the bottom 90% is filled with imprudent personal debt. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,260
Mian and Sufi,261 and Raghuram G. Rajan262 all make the point that consumer
257
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debt is a canary in the coal mine for systemic risk. I am persuaded by these
insights and empirical evidence. Therefore, I urge that the Fed and possibly
FSOC incorporate undue expansions of consumer debt into models of financial
systemic risk and macroeconomic predictions.
CONCLUSION
“[A]lthough the financiers bear the primary responsibility for the depression, I
do not think they can be blamed for it – implying moral censure – any more
than one can blame a lion for eating a zebra. Capitalism is Darwinian.”263
- Richard Posner
Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
As I have discussed, contrary to the conventional wisdom that “the
Federal Reserve does not have a role in creating or ameliorating the problem of
economic inequality in America,” my analysis of the Financial Crisis of 2008
directly implicates the Fed in a central role before the crisis. The Fed’s program
of radical deregulation of financial markets and new financial products set the
stage for a market without fences in which the lions ate the zebras.
During the crisis the Fed’s failure to see the converging nodes of the
interdependent networks of a transformed global financial system meant that it
was caught unawares. It did not have a plan; it resorted to its ideological precommitments as the basis for distributing emergency lending worth 12.8
trillion dollars.
In this Article I do not take up the question of the Fed’s democratic
accountability for this enormous control of the wealth of this nation during
the crisis and for many years in the future. Among the many questions that
invite my attention for future research are: the matter of democratic
accountability and transparency of Federal Reserve powers; what is the
meaning of the transformation of the New Deal banking safety net requiring
separation of insured deposits from speculative investments, regulated capital
levels to internalize and restrain risk in exchange for emergency lending to
respond to banking sector panics? Have we entered a new era in which the
genie of regulatory control of financial innovation and its attendant risks
cannot be put back into the bottle? Is the “Bernanke Doctrine” of rescuing
private financial firms without regulation or requirements for traditional cash
buffers to protect taxpayers or transparent fully explanatory balance sheets
now a fait accompli?
263
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Who is responsible for ensuring that homeownership, the centerpiece
of middle- and working-class wealth potential, is financed with stable,
suitable financial products that lead to eventual ownership? Transitory occupancy of homes that never yield real wealth, or the community stability
associated with the pride of eventual complete ownership is a cruel economic
hoax. A central role of government is to mediate the market forces that manipulate the deep longing for participation in homeownership as a fundamental
marker of economic citizenship.264 And the central question for extended
academic and policy discussion on this issue should be: What can the Fed do
about inequality?265
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